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BEYOND MINIMALISM AND USURPATION: 
DESIGNING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO 
CONTROL THE MIS-ENFORCEMENT 
OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
 
PEDRO FELIPE DE OLIVEIRA SANTOS * 
ABSTRACT 
Two opposing arguments–judicial restraint and judicial activism–have 
polarized the constitutional law debate on the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights in developing countries. The former argues that 
judicial under-enforcement would be preferable to judicial over-
enforcement of rights, so that courts should adopt weak remedies when 
implementing policies and legislation. The latter argues the contrary, 
prescribing strong review as an efficient mechanism of enforcement. 
Drawing on empirical research on the right to health care-related 
litigation in Brazil, this work presents evidence that constitutional law has 
fallen into a false dichotomy. Neither of these two arguments offers a 
complete account of the core of the case of the judicial implementation of 
socio-economic rights: the mis-enforcement of rights, a scenario in which 
the protection of a target group causes unintended distributive and 
aggregate effects that increase overall inequality. As the empirical 
findings demonstrate, under the Brazilian institutional arrangements, with 
characteristics shared by other developing countries, mis-enforcement 
may arise from both under- and over-enforcement of rights. For this 
reason, the level of review alone is an insufficient criterion to build a 
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universal formula of judicial decision-making in socio-economic rights-
related litigation. Besides, two overlooked structural factors may be the 
root of the mis-enforcement issue: a litigation system focused on 
individualized lawsuits, as well as a formalist rights-based legal reasoning 
adopted by courts, which disregards institutional arrangements and costs 
of compliance with rulings. In order to reorient the debate, this paper 
argues that judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is legitimate as 
long as it commits to 1) enriching the political process, mainly by pushing 
issues back to political players with correct incentives of action and 
institutional adherence, and 2) fixing minor counter-majoritarian issues 
related to the distribution of limited public resources, mainly by 
guaranteeing basic needs to the most disadvantaged groups. Instead of 
adopting a universal formula of judicial review, this dual purpose requires 
courts dealing with socio-economic rights implementation to enhance 
their actual institutional capacities in order to build case-by-case 
remedies that 1) take into account issues more likely to arise in this kind of 
litigation, such as types of needs and recipients, and distributive and 
aggregate impacts of rulings; as well as 2) promote political engagement, 
institutional accountability, and democratic representativeness.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In September 2015, access to phosphoethanolamine was interrupted for 
cancer patients taking part in drug trials at the São Paulo State University.1  
Administrators at this prominent public institution acted to prohibit 
researchers from distributing unregistered substances. Despite a lack of 
scientific evidence of phosphoethanolamine’s efficacy when used in 
humans, the Department of Chemistry had been producing and distributing 
it free of charge, claiming an ability to kill tumor cells.2 
In October 2015, the Brazilian Supreme Court agreed with a claim 
brought by an individual plaintiff, and reestablished her access to 
phosphoethanolamine.3 Justice Fachin issued a provisional ruling stating 
that the São Paulo State University was to allow the plaintiff, a terminal 
cancer patient, to continue receiving the phosphoethanolamine.4 This 
ruling called nationwide attention to the alleged benefits of the then-
unknown phosphoethanolamine, leading other patients to request access to 
the same treatment. Subsequently, in February 2016, the university 
claimed it faced a state of chaos, as more than 8,000 rulings from federal 
and state courts had ordered its Department of Chemistry to produce and 
distribute the compound for a multitude of plaintiffs. In order to comply 
with the numerous rulings, the university canceled ongoing research, 
reallocating resources and budgets to transform research labs into 
pharmaceutical production facilities. This creation of a small 
pharmaceutical industry was necessary to produce and distribute adequate 
quantities of needed phosphoethanolamine.5 
This case is just a short chapter in one of the most discussed topics in 
developing countries since the third wave of democracy: the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights.6 Most of the national constitutions 
enacted in the last century have entrenched socio-economic rights, as a 
 
 
1  Heidi Ledford, Brazilian Courts Tussle Over Unproven Cancer Treatment, 527 NATURE 420, 
420-21. 
2  Id. 
3  S.T.F., Pet. 5.828 / SP, Relator: Min. Edson Fachin, 07.10.2015, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL 
FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 20.10.2015  (Braz), 
http://portal.stf.jus.br/processos/detalhe.asp?incidente=4862001.  
4  Id. 
5  See Ledford, supra note 1, at 421. I also express gratitude to Judge Ana Cruvinel for 
providing insightful comments about this case. 
6  For the purpose of this work, I make a distinction between socio-economic rights and 
individual & civil rights. The former includes the rights to health, to education, to culture, to legal aid, 
to work under just and favorable conditions, among others ensured by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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movement to transform a set of basic social needs into enforceable 
entitlements: 144 constitutions have included the right to free education;7 
142 constitutions have recognized the right to health care,8 and 138 
constitutions have recognized the right to work.9 
However, the inefficiency of some states in designing policies that 
guarantee access to socio-economic rights has created complex dynamics 
of enforcement within which the judiciary plays the protagonist. 
Perceiving a shortcut to policy implementation, political actors have 
strategically brought lawsuits against the states asking for rights 
enforcement. Enrollment in housing policies, construction of schools and 
hospitals in poor communities, and improvement of labor conditions 
exemplify the typical claims being brought. In response, courts of 
developing countries have massively reviewed policies and legislation in 
favor of plaintiffs. For instance, since the 1990s, the Constitutional Court 
of South Africa has released remarkable decisions enforcing the right to 
housing,10 the right to health care and access to HIV/AIDS treatment,11 and 
the right to social security.12 In the same fashion, the Indian Supreme Court 
ordered the Government of West Bengal to design a plan guaranteeing 
adequate medical facilities for dealing with health emergency cases, after 
eight hospitals in Calcutta had refused to admit a patient, as vacant beds 
were not available.13 Significant cases may also be found in Brazil, 
Pakistan, Colombia, and Hungary, among other countries.14 
This Article evaluates the involvement of courts in the implementation 
of socio-economic rights, in order to confront the two main arguments 
formulated by constitutional law scholars to address this topic. Scholars 
have split into two lines–minimalism versus activism–as if they were 
mutually exclusive packages, leading to an endless discussion regarding 
the ideal level of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. Both lines 
have been inspired by the American literature on the political roles of 
 
 
7  CONSTITUTE PROJECT, 
https://www.constituteproject.org/search?lang=en&key=edfree&status=in_force&status=is_draft (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2019).  
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  South Africa v. Grootboom  (11) BCLR 1169 (CC). 
11  Minister of Health v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
12  Khosa v. Minister of Soc. Dev., Mahlaule v. Minister of Soc. Dev. 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC) (S. 
Afr.). 
13  Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. West Bengal, AIR 1996 SC 2426 (India). 
14 See SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008).  
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courts and on the legitimacy of the judicial review.15 
The first line generally regards judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights as a usurpation of administrative and legislative functions. Thus, 
judges are prescribed a minimalist, restrained behavior, due to their 
alleged lack of democratic legitimacy to interfere in other branches, as 
well as their asserted lack of institutional capacity in dealing with costly 
rights.16 For this reason, courts should neither redefine social interests 
solidified by democratic institutions nor indirectly reallocate the state 
budget, allowing the executive and legislative branches to formulate 
policies at their discretion and pace. In this view, judicial under-
enforcement would be preferable to the over-enforcement of rights. 
Conversely, the second line has depicted the enforcement of socio-
economic rights as a plausible legitimate task constitutionally assigned to 
courts, especially given the other branches’ reiterate procrastination in 
delivering the social benefits recognized by the constitution. Positive 
social change resulting from the realization of a right helps preserve the 
constitutional normativity and justifies court intervention in policies and 
legislation. Under these assumptions, judicial over-enforcement would be 
preferable to the under-enforcement of rights.  
In sum, the first line adopts a deontological perspective, since an 
abstract, previously asserted lack of democratic legitimacy is taken as 
sufficient criterion to limit court action. By contrast, the second approach 
takes a consequentialist perspective, since the social, moral and normative 
impacts of rulings are taken as concrete sources of judicial legitimacy, and 
thus sufficient criteria to encourage court action. 
In following the same pattern, and also inspired by the American 
scholarship on judicial review, constitutional law scholars have moreover 
contrasted between two strengths of remedies to address the issue. Under 
strong review, courts may strike down and redefine statutes, as well as 
impose structural injunctions on the government.17 Under weak review, 
courts recognize a rights violation, but may not enforce the constitution on 
 
 
15 Professors Jeremy Waldron, Richard Fallon, and Mark Tushnet had a prominent debate on 
judicial review. Against judicial review, see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial 
Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006); in favor of judicial review, see Richard Fallon, The Core of an 
Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (2008); for a critique against both scholars, 
see Mark Tushnet, How Different Are Waldron's and Fallon's Core Cases for and Against Judicial 
Review?, 30 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 49 (2010). 
16  I take cost of rights from the perspective adopted by Cass Sunstein and Stephen Holmes, 
according to which all rights are positive and demand material and affirmative services provided by 
the government. See CASS SUNSTEIN & STEPHEN HOLMES, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY YOUR 
LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (2000).   
17  Fallon, supra note 15, at 1706.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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the same ground,18 thus engaging in dialogical mechanisms to reduce 
tensions between courts and self-governance.19 Mark Tushnet and Cass 
Sunstein have long advocated for the weak form of judicial review.20  
This Article adopts as a case study the judicial enforcement of the right 
to health care in Brazil, which currently represents the most problematic 
field of public law litigation in this country, with 392,921 in-progress 
lawsuits in 2014 accusing the state of ignoring this constitutional right.21 
Drawing on data collected by the Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law 
School,22 the Brazilian National Council of Justice, the Brazilian Ministry 
of Health, and the State of São Paulo, as well as opinions of the Brazilian 
courts, it will provide an overall picture of the health-related litigation and 
its social impacts. 
The empirical findings support the hypothesis that the constitutional 
law debate on judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights has fallen 
into a false dichotomy. Neither of the mainstream models–judicial 
restraint and judicial activism–offers a complete account of the topic at 
stake. The focus of the debate on the ideal level of judicial intervention in 
policies and legislation hides the core of the issue: the mis-enforcement of 
rights, a scenario in which the protection of a target group causes 
unintended, unjustified distributive and aggregate impacts that increase 
overall inequality. 
This scenario, at first glance, seems to weigh against the activist 
perception that judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights favors 
disadvantaged groups and enhances equality, which would lead arguments 
prescribing judicial minimalism or absenteeism to prevail. Indeed, in a 
 
 
18  According to Mark Tushnet, “weak-form of judicial review provides mechanisms for the 
people to respond to decisions that they reasonably believe mistaken that can be deployed more rapidly 
than the constitutional amendment or judicial appointment processes.” MARK TUSHNET, WEAK 
COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 23 (2008) [hereinafter TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS]. See also CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); Mark 
Tushnet, Abolishing Judicial Review, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 581 (2011); Mark Tushnet, The Rise of 
Weak Form Judicial Review, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 321 (Tom Ginsburg & 
Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) [hereinafter Tushnet, Rise of Weak Form]; Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond 
Judicial Minimalism, 43 TULSA L. REV. 825 (2008). 
19  See Tushnet, Rise of Weak Form, supra  note 18, at 321. 
20  See generally sources cited supra note 18. 
21  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, RELATÓRIOS DE CUMPRIMENTO DA RESOLUÇÃO CNJ N. 
107 (National Forum of Health-related Litigation Report), 
http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/programas/forumdasaude/demandasnostribunais.forumSaude.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 9, 2016). 
22 Octavio L. Motta Ferraz, Brazil, Health Inequalities, Rights, and Courts: The Social Impact 
of the Judicialization of Health, in LITIGATING HEALTH RIGHTS, CAN COURTS BRING MORE JUSTICE 
TO HEALTH 76, 83 (Alicia Ely Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds., 2011).  This data was released by the 
International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School’s Human Rights Program. 
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number of cases, courts have issued strong remedies to provide middle 
class individuals with non-basic services, negatively affecting the most 
disadvantaged people, who would otherwise have benefited through 
regular policies.23 However, evidence also demonstrates that, under the 
Brazilian institutional arrangements, with characteristics shared by other 
developing countries, weak and dialogical remedies have not induced real 
policy implementation in a number of other cases.24 When political 
institutions are not keen to dialogue with courts, or when the political 
process seems obstructed, weak remedies have contributed to preserve a 
status of rights violation. In practice, this scenario has left untouched a 
distribution of limited resources that may have adversely damaged 
disadvantaged individuals who would otherwise have benefited if 
protection had not been denied.  
On the contrary, successful cases of both under- and over- enforcement 
scenarios have also been found. For instance, in the late 1990s, many 
courts imposed structural injunctions to provide individual plaintiffs with 
HIV/AIDS drugs. The aggregate impact of the rulings incentivized the 
government to formulate a policy of universal access to HIV/AIDS 
treatment.25 On the other side, dialogical remedies imposed to provide 
hospital beds to patients with health emergencies have proved successful 
in the Federal Court for the First Circuit.26 In sum, in dysfunctional 
political environments, as in Brazil, both strong and weak review have led 
to both successful and tragic outcomes. 
Overall, the evidence allows us to conclude that the scenario of mis-
enforcement has no necessary connection with either under- or over-
enforcement of socio-economic rights, as mis-enforcement may arise from 
both. Indeed, causality between under- and mis-enforcement, or between 
over- and mis-enforcement, has been contingent. Therefore, the strength of 
review alone is an insufficient criterion to build a formula of judicial 
decision-making in socio-economic rights-related litigation. The 
constitutional law dichotomy minimalism versus activism fails exactly 
because it uses the strength of review as the main criteria for defining an 
ideal picture of court behavior. 
Beyond the level of judicial intervention in policies and legislation, two 
 
 
23  See infra Section 1.2. 
24  See infra Section 1.2. 
25  Florian F. Hoffman & Fernando R. N. Bentes, Accountability for Social and Economic Rights 
in Brazil, in COURTING SOCIAL JUSTICE: JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS 
IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD 100, 101, 113-25, 122 (Varun Gauri & Daniel Brinks eds., 2008). 
26  See infra Section 3.3. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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structural circumstances stand out to explain the mis-enforcement 
phenomenon. The first is the formalist, rights-based legal reasoning 
adopted by courts (a pathology that Daryl Levinson calls “rights 
essentialism”).27 The second is the structure of the litigation system, which 
privileges individualized claims over collective actions, even though both 
may address individual rights. Both structural factors restrain judges from 
addressing not only issues regarding institutional arrangements, but also 
issues more likely to arise in socio-economic rights-related claims, such as 
the costs of implementing rights, the distributive and aggregate impacts of 
the rulings, and the types of needs and the groups of beneficiaries that 
deserve priority given budgetary constraints. This amalgam imposes social 
costs that affect the legitimacy and the efficiency of the judicial 
intervention in socio-economic issues. 
According to Richard Fallon, “[i]f judicial review is reasonably 
designed to improve the substantive justice of a society’s political 
decisions by safeguarding against violations of fundamental rights, then it 
is not unfair, nor is it necessarily politically illegitimate.”28 He further notes 
that “[t]he fairness and political legitimacy of procedural mechanisms 
depend on the ends that they serve.”29 Taking these insights as premises to 
be applied to reorient this debate, this Article argues that judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights is legitimate as long as it commits 
to two aspects. First is enriching the democratic process, especially by 
pushing issues back to political players with correct incentives to act and 
institutional adherence wherever possible. Very basic claims on health 
care have been brought before courts because the enforcement of rights 
through regular political mechanisms has failed. In these circumstances, 
courts may function as catalysts, by fixing obstructed political channels 
 
 
27 Daryl Levinson defines rights essentialism as the conventional way of understanding 
constitutional law, in which rights and remedies have an absolute dependence: 
Judicially recognized rights are legitimated by their special relationship to constitutionally 
enshrined values, while judicially mandated remedies are only provisionally warranted by 
their master-servant relationship with the rights they are designed to enforce. While it is 
meaningless to speak of remedies apart from their instrumental value in operationalizing 
some right, rights can be talked about and understood – indeed, can be best understood – in 
complete isolation from (merely) remedial concerns. In a phrase, rights and remedies are 
made of different stuff – and the rights stuff is better. 
Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857-58 
(1999). Levinson challenges this conventional perspective, by saying that “rights essentialism depends 
on an oversimplified picture of the relationship between rights and remedies, which are both less 
separate and more equal than this picture suggests.”  Id. at 858. See also Charles F. Sabel, 
Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1054. 
28  Fallon, supra note 15, at 1735. 
29  Id. 
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and inducing positive social impact with reduced risk of mis-enforcement. 
Second is fixing minor counter-majoritarian issues related to the 
distribution of limited public resources, especially by guaranteeing basic 
needs to the most disadvantaged groups.30  
Achieving this dual purpose requires courts to abandon the exclusive 
choice between weak and strong review, because “rights may be more or 
less entrenched, as may the guarantee of judicial review as a mechanism to 
enforce fundamental rights.”31 The binary discussion does not fit the 
complexity of rights enforcement in dysfunctional political environments. 
Expanding the spectrum of choices allows courts to navigate the vast 
range of combinations of procedures, remedies, interpretations of rights, 
level of scrutiny,32 and their possible outcomes. In some situations, courts 
may find that weak remedies would be sufficient, while other cases may 
require stronger incentives of state action. 
In doing so, courts should enhance their institutional capacities in order 
to build case-by-case remedies linked to institutional arrangements. This 
calls for a design approach: constitutional law should focus on supplying 
courts with expertise in building procedures and remedies that minimize 
mis-enforcement and promote institutional accountability, political 
engagement and democratic representativeness with the lowest possible 
level of intervention. 
This enterprise takes for granted that socio-economic rights are 
justiciable. In the Brazilian institutional context, with characters also 
shared by other developing countries, there is no room to consider that 
these rights constitute a program to be implemented at the discretion of the 
executive and the legislature without any role for courts. Such a position 
would be unacceptable, as the normative and transformative character of 
the 1988 Constitution supports judicial enforcement. If the state does not 
observe a right granted by the Constitution, the courts should not overlook 
the violation. The question is not whether courts may intervene, but how 
courts may intervene according to constitutional parameters.  
This project also assumes that, although courts are unelected bodies, 
they assume an important role as a check on the other branches of 
government, by enhancing democracy under the counter-majoritarian 
task.33 Despite some fair criticism, there has been a global movement in 
 
 
30  See Matthew Stephenson, Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?, 42 
J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 333-37 (2013). 
31  Fallon, supra note 15, at 1733. 
32  KATHARINE G. YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 137 (2012). 
33  See Matthew Stephenson & Justin Fox, Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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which courts “have clearly become part of the social and economic policy 
setting and enforcement across the world.”34 For this reason, this Article 
does not discuss whether courts have the legitimacy to enforce rights, but 
how they construct their legitimacy. 
Neither of these assumptions implies that courts should be the main 
arena of enforcement, or that they should exercise unlimited power. By 
emphasizing their importance as the last resort of enforcement, this work’s 
purpose is to draw guidelines to improve judicial intervention in order to 
undermine the issue of mis-enforcement. 
This work is structured in three parts. Part one provides an overall 
picture of health-related litigation in Brazil and its social impacts. It 
presents empirical data that support the concept of mis-enforcement of 
rights. Part two links the health-related litigation to current Brazilian 
institutional arrangements, in order to analyze the roles that the judicial 
branch assumes within a dysfunctional political environment, and to show 
how political conditions affect the debate over judicial review. Part three 
develops some theoretical premises adopted to articulate a design 
approach to judicial review. This approach takes concrete form in a set of 
proposals for structural reforms of the Brazilian litigation system, which 
also could be applied to other countries. 
 
1. JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS: 
A CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE 
1.1. The case study: purposes and justification 
In this section, I draw on the findings of empirical research undertaken 
by the Human Rights Clinic at Harvard Law School on judicial 
enforcement of the right to health in Brazil from 2009 to 2011.35 These 
findings are supplemented with data provided in 2015 by the Brazilian 
Justice National Council, the Ministry of Health, and the State of São 
Paulo. This information is used to provide a high-level picture of the 
enforcement of the right to health in Brazil, over which some conclusions 
are drawn, as a methodological basis for the next steps of this enterprise.  
Two reasons support the decision for a case study on the right to health 
 
 
105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 397 (2011); see also Matthew Stephenson, The Welfare Effects of Minority-
Protective Judicial Review, 27 J. THEORETICAL POL. 499 (2015). 
34  Nick Robinson, Expanding Judiciaries: India and the Rise of the Good Governance Court, 8 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 63 (2009). 
35 See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 83. 
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in Brazil. The first reason is the magnitude of this litigation. There is no 
accurate data on the lawsuits involving other socio-economic rights, 
whereas the numbers of health-related lawsuits are available and 
staggering: almost 400,000 in progress as of June 2014.36 A shared 
common sense prevails among legal professionals–judges, public 
attorneys, lawyers, and others–that health-related litigation outweighs 
litigation on any other socio-economic right in Brazil. Its impacts have 
raised institutional concerns: in 2009 the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) 
held a public hearing to discuss the issue.37 Players from the executive, 
legislative, and judicial branches, NGOs, academics, and medical 
professionals participated.38 As a result of this event, the National Council 
of Justice (CNJ) set up a working group to propose practical lines to guide 
courts in dealing with health-related adjudication.39 In 2010, this working 
group was converted into the Judicial National Forum on Health Care 
Litigation, whose ambitious plans included the monitoring of law suits, 
data collection, diagnosis of issues related to compliance, and support for 
court administration.40  
The second reason for this case study is pragmatic. There is 
surprisingly little empirical research on the enforcement of socio-
economic rights in Brazil. Thus, health data is doubly useful. Not only is 
the enforcement of the right to health available, there is much more 
comprehensive data available than for the few other socio-economic rights 
that are researched. Political institutions have never given much attention 
to the impact of this litigation on other socio-economic rights, which 
jeopardizes any attempt at accurate analysis. 
 
1.2. The case study: the judicial enforcement of the right to health care 
in Brazil and its associate discourses 
Discussions of health-related litigation disclose a conflict between two 
arguments. The first argument is that courts positively enforce 
constitutional rights, filling the gap left by the executive and legislative 
 
 
36  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, supra note 21. 
37  Public Hearing on the Right to Health Care, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, 
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=processoAudienciaPublicaSaude (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2019). 
38  Attendees, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL,   
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=processoAudienciaPublicaSaude&pagina=Cron
ograma (last visited Feb. 25, 2019). 
39  Fórum da Saúde, CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, http://www.cnj.jus.br/programas-e-
acoes/forum-da-saude (last visited Mar. 28, 2019). 
40  Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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branches: judicial enforcement reduces inequality, improves the 
distribution of goods, and thus enhances democracy. The second argument 
is that courts negatively interfere with established public policies, and that 
courts also lack capacity and legitimacy to intervene successfully in the 
formulation and the execution of those policies: judicial enforcement 
worsens overall inequality instead of enhancing the distribution of goods, 
and thus weakens democracy. 
My hypothesis is that neither argument is accurate. Scholars usually 
embrace either the first or the second argument, as if they were mutually 
exclusive packages, where the validity of one necessitates the invalidity of 
the other. However, judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights can 
only be properly addressed if both arguments are taken as complementary, 
since they are interdependent. Instead of negating each other, one balances 
the other, since they describe different aspects of the same complex social 
phenomenon. 
General information. In June 2014, Brazilian courts informed the 
National Council of Justice that there were 392,921 health-related lawsuits 
in-progress (62,291 lawsuits in the federal courts and 330,630 in the state 
courts).41 The figure has been progressively increasing every year. The 
State of São Paulo informed the NCJ that 11,633 new claims were 
registered in 2011, 12,031 in 2012, 14,080 in 2013, 14,383 in 2014, and 
18,045 in 2015.42 Each of those cases was filed against the government (the 
federal union, the states, and/or municipalities).43 The research did not 
include claims against private health insurers or other private players. 
Most health-related lawsuits are individualized. An individual plaintiff 
brings a lawsuit against the state and requests a provision that will benefit 
him exclusively. The International Human Rights Clinic found that during 
the years 2005-2009, 97% of the claims in the federal courts were 
individual; only 3% were collective actions.44 According to the State of São 
Paulo, collective claims amounted to 7% of the actions in 2010.45 
The claims are diverse, but most of them ask for the provision of 
 
 
41  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, supra note 21. 
42  CONSELHO ESTADUAL DE SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO, JUDICIALIZAÇÃO–SP 10 (2016), 
http://www.saude.sp.gov.br/resources/ces/homepage/imagens-noticias/judicializacao_-_sp_-
_braganca.pdf. 
43  Id. at 17. 
44  See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 87. 
45  Michel Naffah Filho, Ana Luisa Chieffi & Maria Cecília M. M. A. Correa, S-Codes: A New 
System of Information on Lawsuits of the State Department of Health of São Paulo, 7(84) BOLETIM 
EPIDEMIOLÓGICO PAULISTA 18, 22 (2010), 
http://periodicos.ses.sp.bvs.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S1806-
42722010001200003&lng=es&nrm=iso&tlng=pt (last visited Mar. 27, 2019). 
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medicines. The State of São Paulo reported that 66.1% of the lawsuits in 
2010 involved access to drugs, whereas 30.5% involved medical services, 
such as surgeries and beds in hospitals.46 
The costs of compliance are impressive. It is difficult to measure 
exactly how much the public institutions have spent on funding all the 
medical treatments and services ordered by courts, but some fragmented 
statistics furnish evidence of their impact on the health care budget. In 
2009, the federal union, states, and municipalities spent a total of R$2 
billion (US$1 billion) to comply with judicial decisions.47 The Harvard 
International Human Rights Clinic found that in 2008, health-related 
litigation consumed R$400 million (US$200 million) of the state of São 
Paulo’s budget, R$78 million (US$20 million) of the state of Minas 
Gerais’ budget, and R$84 million (US$42 million) of the federal 
government’s budget.48 In São Paulo, those numbers increased to R$547 
million in 2014, and to R$1 billion in 2015.49 
Verifying the social impact. This part confronts the general data with 
distributive standards. This Article assumes that, if courts adopt the 
argument that enforcing socio-economic rights is a matter of distribution 
of goods, any reasonable evaluation should look at the group of persons 
benefited, the types of services that courts have ordered, and the services’ 
equivalent costs.  
The 1988 Constitution provides the right to health for all citizens. 
Articles 196 and 197 state that health care is a universal right and imposes 
a duty to the state to furnish equitable access to social policies: 
Article 196. Health is the right of all and the duty of the National 
Government and shall be guaranteed by social and economic 
policies aimed at reducing the risk of illness and other maladies and 
by universal and equal access to all activities and services for its 
promotion, protection and recovery.50 
Article 197. Health activities and services are of public importance, 
and it is the Government's responsibility to provide, in accordance 
with the law, for their regulation, supervision and control. Such 
 
 
46  Id. at 27. 
47  See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 83. 
48  Id. 
49  CONSELHO ESTADUAL DE SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO, supra note 42; see also SP cria ofensiva 
para combater 'judicialização' da Saúde, SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DA SAÚDE, 
http://www.saude.sp.gov.br/ses/noticias/2016/abril/sp-cria-ofensiva-para-combater-judicializacao-da-
saude (last visited Mar. 27, 2019).  
50  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 196 (Braz.) (transl. by author). 
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activities and services shall be carried out directly or through third 
parties and also by individuals or legal entities of private law.51 
However, rights have costs, and budgetary resources are limited.52 
Health care is a social right whose implementation requires the design of 
costly public policies. When enforcing rights and asking for the provision 
of drugs or treatments, courts do not create new budgetary resources. 
Complying with judicial decisions requires the government to reallocate 
budget from established policies. The inclusion of a claimant (individual 
or determined group of people) can lead to the exclusion of third parties 
from public programs. From this perspective, enforcing a socio-economic 
right in fact means reallocating budgetary resources and deciding the 
needs and the beneficiaries that deserve priority.  
Traditionally, courts judge claims only by inquiring as to whom is 
entitled to the right. A rights-based approach entails all citizens having the 
same constitutional right to health. This reasoning explains why 
approximately 80% of the claims receive an affirmative judgment.53 
However, if courts are actually deciding which groups and/or needs have 
priority under a limited budget, their holdings actually establish which 
groups or needs deserve priority. This approach would be adequate if, and 
only if, resources were unlimited. 
Thus, troubling situations arise when an abstract universal entitlement 
meets the concrete limits of the available material resources. The formalist 
criterion who is entitled to the right, which is extracted from the 
constitutional text, is insufficient to evaluate the social phenomenon at 
issue. Any judicial intervention in policies will cause distributive and 
aggregate effects that impact all players. No legal rule controls those 
outcomes, since their character is informal. They take place in the 
“shadows of the law,”54 as part of an invisible bargaining process that 
involves a tradeoff between plaintiffs and third parties. I’ll refer to those 
effects as background rules, or a second code of norms. 
Aggregate effects represent the sum of similar judicial interventions or 
abstentions. Ruling that the state must provide one claimant with a drug 
that costs $1,000 seems to entail no significant impact on the state budget 
and third parties. However, thousands of similar rulings strongly affect the 
 
 
51  CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 197 (Braz.) (transl. by author). 
52 See generally SUNSTEIN & HOLMES, supra note 16. 
53  See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 87. 
54  For a more comprehensive picture of the expression shadows of the law, see Lewis 
Kornhauser & Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadows of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE 
L.J. 954 (1979). 
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health care budget.  
Distributive effects concern how judicial intervention or judicial 
abstention alters the allocation of budget in favor of some individuals and 
affects third parties. Courts generally enforce rights without addressing 
whether a portion of the budget will have to be reallocated. Even the 
government does not produce accurate data of this movement of funds. 
Nevertheless, it asserts that compliance interferes with ongoing policies by 
excluding some groups who would otherwise benefit.  
Thus, aggregate and distributive effects define whether judicial 
intervention or judicial abstention satisfies the constitutional counter-
majoritarian task in each case, since they influence which groups will 
actually benefit from the services provided by health care policies and 
which needs will actually be attended. For this reason, the criterion of who 
is entitled to the right provides an incomplete evaluation of the courts’ 
intervention. New standards are required for this task. The issue concerns 
not only rights, since all citizens are entitled to the same right, but it also 
concerns needs and beneficiaries. If the budget has limits, and if the 
inclusion of claimants causes the exclusion of third parties (the original 
benefited groups of the public programs), courts are more likely to 
enhance equality when they attend to demands that benefit the most 
disadvantaged groups in order to satisfy the most basic needs. 
The empirical data on the distribution of goods are disturbing. For the 
period between 2007 and 2009, the Harvard International Human Rights 
Clinics detected an “extremely high concentration of lawsuits (85 percent) 
in the most developed states of the south and the southeast, even though 
their population represents just 56.8 percent of the country’s total 
population.”55 However, “the north and the northeast together, with 36 
percent of the Brazilian population, accounted for only 7.5 percent of the 
total.”56 In the federal courts, “the ten states with the highest HDI (above 
0.8) together have generated 93.3% of lawsuits . . . , whereas the other 
seventeen states with the lowest HDI (below 0.8) together have originated 
a meager 6.7 percent of lawsuits.”57 In conclusion, the researchers noticed 
that “the higher a region’s level of socio-economic development, the more 
likely it is to have a high volume of health litigation.”58 
This pattern has worsened. According to official data released by the 
National Council of Justice, in 2015, 302,065 out of a total of 330,630 
 
 
55  See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 88. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. at 88. 
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lawsuits were concentrated in the southern and southeastern state courts.59 
This means that for every hundred claims brought before state courts, 
ninety-one are in progress before the courts of the richest regions of the 
country. The concentration increased from 85% in the period of 2007-
2009 to 91% in 2015.60 
Although this data suggests that judicial enforcement has mostly 
benefited the two richest regions of the country, this macro-level picture 
must be examined critically. Even though the south and the southeast are 
the most developed areas in Brazil, they are also home to considerable 
levels of poverty. A concentration of claims in the richest states does not 
necessarily imply mis-enforcement, because disadvantaged groups in the 
richest states may have benefited. There is no evidence that disadvantaged 
groups from the poorest states have more needs than those from the richest 
ones, and even if this were true, state courts could not address this 
problem, since they exercise power locally due to their limited 
jurisdictions. The claims are brought to the courts, which cannot control 
the number of cases in each region. Those statistics alone are inconclusive 
if they are not coupled with some data about who actually benefits from 
this litigation. The inquiry must go deeper, as a macro-level picture of the 
distribution of claims does not offer strong evidence about the success of 
the courts’ intervention. 
In order to achieve more accurate conclusions, specific data released by 
the state of São Paulo was collected. In 2015, the litigation-related 
expenses on health reached more than R$1 billion, but only 0.01% of the 
population benefited.61 In 2014, 60.45% of the claimants presented medical 
prescriptions signed by private doctors as evidence before courts.62 This 
finding supports the argument that the majority of plaintiffs do not 
normally use the public system, and thus may not belong to a 
disadvantaged group. 
The State of São Paulo also reported that its 2015 health care budget 
amounted to R$20 billion. The costs of compliance with the courts’ 
 
 
59  CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, supra note 21. The Brazilian southern courts are TJRS 
(Rio Grande do Sul State Court), TJSC (Santa Catarina State Court), and TJPR (Paraná State Court). 
The southeastern courts are TJMG (Minas Gerais State Court), TJRJ (Rio de Janeiro State Court), 
TJSP (São Paulo State Court), and TJES (Espírito Santo State Court). 
60  Id.  
61  SP cria ofensiva para combater 'judicialização' da Saúde, supra note 49; see also 
Judicialização da saúde em São Paulo aumenta 92% em cinco anos, ANAHP (Sept. 13, 2016), 
https://www.anahp.com.br/noticias/noticias-do-mercado/judicializacao-da-saude-em-sao-paulo-
aumenta-92-em-cinco-anos/.   
62  CONSELHO ESTADUAL DE SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO, supra note 42. 
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rulings consumed R$1 billion. Comparatively, all of the state public 
hospitals consumed around R$3 billion in 2014, among them the Hospital 
das Clínicas, the biggest Brazilian public hospital, whose budget 
amounted to R$1.5 billion in the same period.63 
Another dimension of the disparities of distribution: in 2006, the State 
of São Paulo spent R$65 million on compliance with drug-related claims 
that benefited approximately 3,600 claimants. In the same year, the state 
allocated R$838 million to provide 380,000 individuals with basic 
medication. This means that the average judicial plaintiff cost R$18,000, 
whereas the average patient benefited through the policy cost R$2,200.64  
In order to implement the health care policies, the government of São 
Paulo divided the state into seventeen administrative regions.65 Between 
2011 and 2014, the more developed regions such as Barretos and São José 
do Rio Preto had the highest litigation index (29.34 and 13.51 claims per 
10,000 inhabitants). The poorest region, Registro, had the lowest litigation 
index (0.25 claims per 10,000 inhabitants).66 
Within the municipality of São Paulo, research undertaken in 2006 
found that plaintiffs in 73% of the cases that involved drugs were “patients 
from the three wealthiest areas in the city.”67 This finding suggests that the 
judicial enforcement on health privileged “individuals with higher 
purchasing power and more access to information,”68 who lived in areas 
with little to no social vulnerability. The issue of proper representation is 
as important as the distributive issue. 
A dive into the content of the claims also reveals intriguing 
information. A number of lawsuits ask for drugs not provided by the 
public system, experimental treatments, newly developed drugs, and 
expensive medical supplies. The researchers reported that “[a]t the federal 
level, judicial orders forcing the government to provide thirty-five drugs 
not available in the Brazilian market represented as much as 78.4 percent 
 
 
63  ORÇAMENTOS FISCAL, DA SEGURIDADE SOCIALE DE INVESTIMENTOS DAS EMPRESAS, 
GOVERNO DO ESTADO DE SÃO PAOLO, ORÇAMENTO DO ESTADO 2015, 181 (2015), 
https://www.al.sp.gov.br/repositorio/legislacao/lei/2014/lei-15646-23.12.2014.pdf; see also GOVERNO 
DO ESTADO DE SÃO PAOLO, RELATORIA 1O QUADRIMESTRE 17 (2014), 
http://www.saude.sp.gov.br/resources/ces/homepage/imagens-
noticias/relatorio_1_quad_2014_20_05_5.pdf.  
64 See Ana Luiza Chieffi & Rita Barradas Barata, Ações Judiciais: Estratégia da Indústria 
Farmacêutica para Introdução de Novos Medicamentos, 44 REV. SAÚDE PÚBLICA 421, 427 (2010). 
65  See CONSELHO ESTADUAL DE SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO, supra note 42, at 11.  
66  Id. at 14. 
67  Ana Luiza Chieffi & Rita Barradas Barata, Judicialização Da Política Pública De 
Assistência Farmacêutica e Eqüidade, 25 CAD. SAÚDE PÚBLICA  1839, 1839 (2009). 
68  Id. 
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of the costs of all right-to-health litigation in 2009.”69 In addition, 
according to the Ministry of Health, the cost of compliance involving the 
forty most expensive drugs amounted to $431 million in 2013, which 
represented 54% of the whole state budget for exceptional medications.70 
The most common medicines requested were not related to the more 
neglected diseases, such as Chagas, dengue, or leprosy, diseases which 
primarily affect economically disadvantaged groups.  
There is also evidence that the Brazilian pharmaceutical industry may 
have been using the litigation system as a strategy to introduce new drugs 
into the market, by funding patients’ litigation costs. Researchers from the 
state of São Paulo identified the existence of a market for lawsuits by 
assessing “the distribution of lawsuits aiming at identifying the dispersion 
or concentration of the legal professionals filing these suits.”71 They found 
that, in 2006, a considerable number of the cases in the state were “aimed 
at obtaining expensive, sophisticated and newly marketed drugs and, 
therefore, aimed at drugs that have not accumulated a lot of experience in 
 
 
69  Ferraz, supra note 22, at 92. 
70  TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DA UNIÃO, RELATÓRIO SISTÊMICO DE FISCALIZAÇÃO DA SAÚDE 24 
(2015), 
https://portal.tcu.gov.br/lumis/portal/file/fileDownload.jsp?fileId=8A8182A253234F6C015351CDC9
B51A70&inline=.  
71  Chieffi & Barata, supra note 64, at 421-22. The research was described as follows:  
 
OBJECTIVE: To assess the distribution rate of legal suits according to drug (manufacturer), 
prescribing physician, and attorney filing the lawsuit.  
 
METHODS: A descriptive study was carried out to assess the lawsuits in the São Paulo State 
(Southeastern Brazil) courts registry in 2006, and amounts spent in complying with these 
lawsuits, and total costs with medication thus resulting. 
 
RESULTS: In 2006, the São Paulo State Administration spent 65 million Brazilian reais in 
compliance with court decisions to provide medication to approximately 3,600 individuals. 
The total cost of the medication was 1.2 billion Brazilian reais. In the period studied, 2,927 
lawsuits were examined. These lawsuits were filed by 565 legal professionals, among which 
549 were attorneys engaged by private individuals (97.17% of the total legal professionals). 
The drugs scope of the lawsuits had been prescribed by 878 different physicians. By assessing 
the number of lawsuits filed per attorney, it was found that 35% of the lawsuits were brought 
before the courts by 1% of the attorneys.  
 
CONCLUSIONS: The data related to the lawsuits and to the medication classified according 
to manufacturer shows that a small number of attorneys are responsible for the largest number 
of lawsuits filed to obtain these drugs. The finding that more than 70% of the lawsuits filed 
for certain drugs are the responsibility of one single attorney may suggest a close connection 
between this professional and the manufacturer. 
Id.  (Translation at http://www.scielo.br/pdf/rsp/v44n3/en_05.pdf). 
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terms of usage.”72 They also verified that “a small number of lawyers are 
associated with a large number of lawsuits suggesting they specialize in 
this kind of lawsuit.”73 For instance, “only 36 lawyers were responsible for 
filing 76 percent of the cases.”74 The same research was undertaken in the 
state of Minas Gerais and found the same unusual association between 
doctors and law firms on judicial requests for drugs.75 These findings do 
not conclusively establish that pharmaceutical companies are subsidizing 
lawsuits as a strategy to market their products, but the body of evidence 
makes the hypothesis plausible. 
All of the evidence supports the following conclusions: 1) there is a 
remarkable amount of litigation against the state on the right to health; 2) 
more than 90% of the cases are individual claims, and they benefit 
individuals or small groups; 3) a considerable number of the claims 
involve the provision of drugs and medical treatments, of which a 
considerable part consists of non-basic services; 4) the cost of compliance 
requires a reallocation of existing budgetary resources designated for 
established public policies; 5) the number of benefited claimants tends to 
be smaller than the number of citizens who would have benefited if the 
same amount of money had been applied to the existing programs; and 6) 
many of the judgments benefit people who are not economically 
disadvantaged and who do not rely on public health service. 
The next subsection draws on these conclusions to develop the concept 
 
 
72  Id. at 424. 
73  Id. at 425. 
74  Id. 
75  This research analyzed empirical data from 1999 to 2009 and was described as follows:  
 
METHODS: Retrospective descriptive study based on data from administrative files, relating 
to lawsuits involving medicine demands, in the state of Minas Gerais, Southeastern Brazil, 
from October 1999 to October 2009;  
 
RESULTS: A total of 2,412 lawsuits were analyzed with 2,880 medicine requests, including 
18 different drugs, 12 of them provided through Pharmaceutical Policies of the Brazilian 
National Health System (SUS). The most frequent medicines requested were adalimumab, 
etanercept, infliximab, insulin glargine and tiotropium bromide. The main diseases were 
rheumatoid arthritis, ankylosing spondylitis, diabetes mellitus, and chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease. Private lawyers and doctors were predominant. The results revealed the 
association between doctors and law offices on drug requests. Among the lawsuits filed by 
the office A, 43.6% had a single prescriber to adalimumab, while 29 doctors were responsible 
for 40.2% of the same drug prescriptions. A single doctor was responsible for 16.5% of the 
adalimumab prescriptions being requested through lawsuits filed by a single private law 
office in 44.8% of legal proceedings. 
 
Campos Neto OH, Doctors, Lawyers, and Pharmaceutical Industry on Health Lawsuits in Minas 
Gerais, Southeastern Brazil, 46 REV. SAÚDE PÚBLICA 784, 785 (2012). 
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of mis-enforcement of rights and to explain how informal rules undermine 
the courts’ general discourse that enforcing socio-economic rights 
enhances equality. 
  
 
1.3.  The concept of mis-enforcement of rights 
The last section provided evidence that the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights involves a complex dynamic among players that 
transcends the relationships between claimants, courts and state officials, 
and the discourse of rights and legal interests. Evaluating this social 
phenomenon from a formalist perspective based on the language of rights, 
impersonal principles, and legal interests gives a limited picture of a 
claimant seeking the enforcement of a constitutional right, followed by a 
court ordering the state to implement a public service. 
Excluded by this formalist framing are the background rules that 
structure these dynamics. Far from being an isolated action that will only 
impact the litigation parties (claimants and the state), every judicial 
intervention produces aggregate and distributive impacts, ruled by 
informal social norms that influence the enforcement’s outcomes. 
The existence of informal norms is revealed in the incoherence of the 
Brazilian jurisprudence concerning the right to health: for similar claims, 
the rate of success of individualized claims is considerably higher than the 
rate of success of the collective ones. According to Hoffman and Bentes, 
“courts have been very open to these individual claims and much less 
willing to accept collective claims.”76 The arguments made in judicial 
decisions show that courts generally address aggregate and distributive 
effects when deciding collective claims. The same considerations do not 
appear in most of the individual claims, which rely solely on a rights-
based discourse. This difference indicates that collective actions induce 
courts to go beyond their formalist analysis of rights and legal interests to 
visualize the claim and its impacts on third parties, in epistemic terms. 
By putting together informal and formal norms, it is possible to achieve 
a comprehensive picture of the phenomenon. Legislators, official agents, 
courts, claimants, and third parties comprise a complex network of players 
whose behaviors dictate the dynamics of the distribution of resources. 
At this point, it is important to distinguish the enforcement of 
individual and political rights–also referred to as negative rights and first-
 
 
76  Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 25, at 101. 
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generation rights–from the enforcement of socio-economic rights–also 
referred to as positive rights and second-generation rights. It is taken for 
granted that both impose budgetary constraints, as the traditional 
distinction between negative and positive rights has proved false.77 For 
instance, granting the right to vote requires a budget to maintain the 
electoral system. In the same way, the enforcement of the right to property 
demands regulatory and security mechanisms, which entail costs. In sum, 
even negative rights presuppose a regulatory, or at least a supervisory 
system.  
One may argue that second-generation rights are always more 
expensive than first-generation rights. In Brazil, the Ministry of Health has 
the third highest budget in the federal government, the second highest of 
which is the social security system, followed in close succession by the 
programs of education, social labor, and social assistance.78 However, the 
cost of enforcement does not serve as a criterion of distinction. There is no 
guarantee that this pattern will always repeat itself, or that it is a general 
rule in most of the welfare states. Tushnet notes that distinct contexts may 
result in different costs, so that political and individual rights may be more 
expensive in some situations.79 
He further suggests that the costs of first-generation rights are 
“generally invisible because they are diffused across the society as a whole 
without openly figuring in government budgets.”80 In contrast, second-
generation rights are described very precisely in budget statements, with 
the result that the government directly notices the impact caused by 
rulings. 
It is possible to develop these reservations further. Compared to 
individual rights, socio-economic rights are, to a greater extent, 
progressively and asymmetrically implementable, with the possible 
combination of three axes: needs (the services covered), beneficiaries (the 
population covered), and costs (the proportion of costs covered).81  
Progressive implementation means that even though second-generation 
 
 
77  See SUNSTEIN & HOLMES, supra note 16, at 37-48. 
78 TRIBUNAL DE CONTAS DA UNIÃO, supra note 70, at 3. 
79  Mark Tushnet, Reflections on Judicial Enforcement of Social and Economic Rights in the 
Twenty-First Century, 4 NUJS L. REV. 177, 180 (2011). For an investigation into the obligations 
imposed by positive rights, see SANDRA FREDMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TRANSFORMED: POSITIVE RIGHTS 
AND POSITIVE DUTIES (2008). 
80  See Tushnet, supra note 79, at 180. 
81 See M. J. Roberts, W. C. Hsiao & M. R. Reich, Disaggregating the Universal Coverage 
Cube: Putting Equity in the Picture, 1 HEALTH SYS. & REFORM 22, 27 (2015). This article discusses 
the World Health Organization's “Cube Diagram,” a globally recognized visual representation of 
health system reform choices, and proposes accommodations in order to properly address equality. 
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rights are as justiciable as first-generation rights, the lack of universal 
coverage may be tolerated as a temporary status. The normative structure 
of these types of rights may be split into degrees of enforcement. States 
follow steps towards universal and equal coverage under reasonable 
justification based on the three axes. For instance, the World Health 
Organization proposes a plan towards universal health coverage that 
recommends the following steps: first, to classify services into priority 
classes according to their cost-effectiveness, giving priority to those who 
are worse off, as well as the financial risk protection; second, to 
universalize high-priority services-related coverage; third, to expand low- 
or medium-priority services-related coverage.82 
Oriented asymmetrical implementation means that second-generation 
rights are constitutionally protected in order to address social and 
economic inequality and redistribution of goods to a greater extent than 
the first-generation rights. Unlike freedom of speech, the right to vote, and 
property rights, socio-economic rights allow for different levels of 
protection, taking into account the economic status of the targeted group 
and the cost of the service. The state is allowed to prioritize specific 
services and groups.  
Asymmetry is grounded in budget constraints, which are more visible 
in second-generation than in first-generation rights. This point leads to 
another argument: aggregate and distributive economic impacts are likely 
to be stronger with respect to the enforcement of socio-economic rights 
than political rights. The difference is one of relative sensitivity. Any 
recognition and enforcement of a need and of a beneficiary theoretically 
implies the exclusion at a certain point in time of other needs and 
beneficiaries. 
Courts argue that judicial review is more likely to enhance equality if it 
orients state efforts towards benefitting disadvantaged groups in order to 
provide basic needs. It is not a decision concerning socio-economic rights; 
it is a decision concerning needs and beneficiaries. 
The empirical data indicate that this premise has been found false in a 
number of cases which have benefited upper- and middle-class groups. 
Courts have ordered the state to pay for medical treatments and drugs that 
are not classified by the state as basic needs, and/or the number of 
beneficiaries is relatively small. This means that budgetary resources have 
been reoriented to benefit non-disadvantaged people in order to provide 
 
 
82  See WORLD HEALTH ORG., MAKING FAIR CHOICES ON THE PATH TO UNIVERSAL HEALTH 
COVERAGE (2014). 
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them with non-basic needs. There is no specific data as to how often this 
reallocation occurs and what programs are undermined to comply with the 
rulings. However, since the government designs public services of health 
care in Brazil to prioritize the basic needs of disadvantaged groups, the 
evidence supports the conclusion that judicial enforcement shifts budget 
priorities from the bottom towards upper levels, and concentrates 
resources instead of redistributing them. This is the reality behind the 
rhetoric of the courts’ general discourse of enhancing equality. In the name 
of justice, courts may worsen inequality. 
In fact, those groups of cases seem to benefit middle- and upper-class 
patients who want to have access to medical treatments and drugs not yet 
provided by the public service. In general, if these groups do not regularly 
use the public system, one interpretation is that they are seeking to “get 
out” of the system what they “put in”; i.e., they are not getting the services 
most taxpayers pay for–they are only seeking a narrow band, albeit an 
expensive band. 
There is a counterargument that confronts that data with the taxpayers’ 
profile.83 Taxation aggressively affects the low-income rather than the 
high-income population. This argument claims that since the lower and 
middle class pay for much of the state budget, there is no mistake in 
enforcing socio-economic rights in their favor. 
However, this idea does not take into account that even in this 
situation, courts’ general discourse of enhancing equality remains 
rhetorical, since the core of the problem is not only that they may benefit 
from the state budget, but that courts redistribute resources that were 
originally supposed to assist the most disadvantaged. This redistribution 
breaks a chain of enforcement that follows a reasoned path towards equal 
and universal coverage previously defined by the governmental programs. 
All those circumstances draw a scenario in which the judicial 
protection of a socio-economic right in favor of an individual or a target 
group causes non-justified distributive and aggregate effects that worsen 
overall inequality. As a deficit of justified inclusiveness, this figure, which 
I call mis-enforcement of rights, undermines the counter-majoritarian role. 
Three brief points should be noted. First, the criticism captured in my 
concept of mis-enforcement does not require the conclusion that courts 
must not benefit non-disadvantaged groups or enforce (non-basic) services 
at all. The point is rather that, if courts intend the equality-based argument 
to justify their reasoning, they should address distributive and aggregate 
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impact and informal norms that influence enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. Limiting the discourse of equality to talk about rights may produce 
a pattern of incoherent decisions. If all the norms (formal and informal) 
and their linkage to types of axes were acknowledged, the likelihood of 
constructing a jurisprudence that positively impacts equality would 
increase.   
Second, the idea of mis-enforcement seems to support the second 
argument of the previous section: judicial enforcement worsens overall 
inequality instead of enhancing the distribution of goods, and thus 
weakens democracy. Scholars who are against judicial enforcement share 
this opinion. The research undertaken by the International Human Rights 
Clinic at Harvard Law School concluded that “the model’s overall social 
impact is negative.”84 It also asserted that “rather than enhancing the 
provision of health benefits that are badly needed by the most 
disadvantaged . . . this model diverts essential resources of the health 
budget to the funding of mostly high cost drugs claimed by individuals 
who are already privileged in terms of health conditions and services.”85    
I would not be so conclusive. The data suggest that the concept of the 
mis-enforcement of rights is applicable to some, but not all of the rulings. 
In fact, a number of judicial interventions achieved positive social 
outcomes, including incentivizing the government to improve the public 
health care system. Additionally, the empirical findings also allow the 
conclusion that a significant amount of disadvantaged people benefited 
from litigation.86 On the one hand, the Government of São Paulo affirms 
that 60% of plaintiffs of drug-related suits relied on prescriptions signed 
by private doctors. According to state officials, these claimants are likely 
private systems users, and, for this reason, not disadvantaged individuals. 
On the other hand, up to 40% of the claimants relied on prescriptions 
signed by doctors of the public system, which would be evidence of being 
economically disadvantaged. This percentage is not insignificant.87 
Furthermore, part of the group of the presumed private system users may 
have been denied an appointment with a doctor in the public system, 
although they were part of a lower-class group. In the same way, many 
reasonable hypotheses could be developed to contradict the presumptions 
of some state officials. In fact, the evidence also supports the first 
argument that judicial enforcement reduces inequality, improves the 
 
 
84  See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 100. 
85  Id. 
86  See supra Section 1.2.  
87  CONSELHO ESTADUAL DE SAÚDE DE SÃO PAULO, supra note 42; see also supra Section 1.2.  
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distribution of goods, and thus enhances democracy. The two claims are 
not mutually exclusive, but rather highlight different aspects of the same 
social phenomenon. 
The complex picture painted by the Brazilian data explains why I am 
critiquing the study on the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: 
to conclude that courts can induce the mis-enforcement of socio-economic 
rights cannot be the end of the inquiry, but rather its starting point. If 
social impact is the criterion for evaluating courts’ performance, there is 
no definitive evidence that situations of mis-enforcement are the general 
rule, and that judicial intervention should be avoided as the primary 
answer.  
The next step is identifying the roots of the mis-enforcement of rights. 
The next section will move beyond the traditional discourse about judicial 
review and look more closely at the judiciary. It will link the conclusions 
of this section to the institutional arrangements that influence the 
enforcement of rights and the relationship between courts and other 
political institutions. 
2. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE, POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS AND 
COURTS: PLAYING THE JUDICIAL ROLE   
2.1. A critique of the critique again: turning to constitutional law 
The debate over the enforcement of socio-economic rights in Brazil 
seems as endless as it is repetitive. The literature is extensive, but it 
usually disregards structural and genealogical issues. Constitutional 
scholars have typically narrowed the discussion down to two basic 
questions: first, whether courts may enforce socio-economic rights (or, in 
a broader sense, whether courts may intervene in the executive and 
legislative acts); and second, how courts must interpret socio-economic 
rights. Although both are important, the data discussed in the last sections 
show that the debate should move beyond these issues. 
The first question is related to the debate over how constitution makers 
should design their system of judicial review. The discussion in Brazil has 
focused on a binary answer: one embraces either the minimalism or the 
activism, as if there were no relevant possibilities between these extremes, 
and more importantly, as if a choice of one of these two options would 
solve problems of mis-enforcement. This formulation sounds like a 
broader restatement of the arguments addressed in the first section. On the 
one side, the argument is that courts must intervene in the government and 
in Congress as much as necessary to provide the basic rights guaranteed 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
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by the Constitution. On the other side, the argument is that courts must not 
intervene at all, or at most play a deferential role. The first argument has 
been the usual language of the courts, which have granted 80% of the 
health-related claims. The second argument has been advanced by the 
majority of scholars who argue that courts negatively impact public 
policies; therefore, judges must exercise self-restraint. The other branches 
should decide the appropriate allocation of resources and the timing for 
instituting granted but extensively ignored rights.  
Both approaches mistakenly reduce the issue to a formalist discussion 
of institutional design and the ideal allocation of powers. In fact, they lack 
any problem-solving commitment and undervalue the actual arrangements 
of Brazilian political institutions. Those models were transplanted from 
American legal scholarship without any reflection on the differences in the 
constitutional orders and political cultures.88 This operation overlooked the 
fact that even the American godfathers of weak judicial review did not 
treat it as a binary discussion,89 but emphasized that different levels of 
scrutiny, remedies, and power may be combined. The binary approach 
adopted in Brazil hides important issues: the political and institutional 
circumstances that influence the judicial enforcement of rights, the 
genealogy of the jurisprudence, and its complex outcomes. 
The second question is related to the content of the legal reasoning 
followed by courts to enforce socio-economic rights. As Roberto Unger 
states, the twentieth century legal discourse is spelled through the 
language of policies and impersonal principles.90 This motif is 
systematically reproduced in the decisions delivered by courts. Both 
 
 
88  For discussion of the American legal scholarship, see sources cited supra note 15. 
89  See TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, supra note 18, at 263-64. 
90  Roberto Unger, on the method of reasoned elaboration, the dominant legal practice of the 
twentieth century, stated that  
[t]he practice of legal analysis that the movement found in command of legal thought 
represented law as a repository of impersonal principles of right and of policies responsive to 
the public interest. It interpreted each fragment of the law by attributing purposes to it. It 
described those purposes on the idealizing language of policy and principle. Call this 
approach, as it was called of its theoreticians, the method of reasoned elaboration. According 
to this method, law was to be interpreted in the best possible light – that is to say, the light 
least tainted by the powerful interests that were likely to have exerted the predominant 
influence in the political contest over the content of law, especially through legislation. By 
putting the best light on the law, the professional interpreters of law, within or outside 
adjudication, could, according to this view, improve the law. They could become the agents 
through whose efforts the law works itself pure, even in an age in which legislation had long 
become to overshadow law made by jurists, whether holding judicial office or not. 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT: ANOTHER TIME, A 
GREATER TASK 5 (2015); see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS 
BECOME (1996). 
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concessive and restrictive decisions adopt the categories of rights and 
interests as keywords. The mainstream debate has focused mainly on the 
correct interpretation to be given to rights and interests.91 However, limited 
attention has also been given to analyzing the constraints that this mode of 
reasoning imposes on the judgments that courts deliver, and even on 
institutional innovation. Cases of mis-enforcement of rights are taken as a 
deviation from the preconceived legislative purpose, rather than as an 
invitation for rethinking legal analysis. A rights-based approach to the 
constitution that generates undesirable outcomes seems to result from the 
courts’ power to decide on the issue. Other considerations should be 
included. Are the remedies adequate for a desirable enforcement? What is 
the desirable pattern of enforcement of socio-economic rights? Is the 
procedure efficient toward the ends that the judicial system seeks? How 
are distributive and aggregative effects measured, and how should they be 
assessed? How do those effects impact the degree of enforcement? 
The first step in resolving the debate over the enforcement of socio-
economic rights requires an understanding of the genealogy of the judicial 
role under the 1988 Constitution. Scholars have mostly criticized the 
current state of affairs, but it is important to understand the circumstances 
that influenced its construction in light of the actual arrangements of 
Brazilian institutions. 
2.2. A transformative constitution within a dysfunctional political 
system 
The most significant symbol of change in the judicial role after the 
promulgation of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution appeared in a repeatedly 
cited statement by the Federal Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that 
“[t]he 1988 Constitution transformed the health care from a simple benefit 
into a justiciable right.”92 
Previous Brazilian constitutions had already entrenched social rights, 
but in narrower terms. The 1988 Constitution not only raised social rights 
to the category of fundamental rights, but it also created a whole section to 
govern the health care system, which was defined by the constituent power 
as a set of “social and economic policies aimed at reducing the risk of 
 
 
91  See Lorraine E. Weinrib, The Postwar Paradigm and American Exceptionalism, in THE 
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 86 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006). 
92  TRF-1, 0028464-45.1995.4.01.0000, Relator: Juiz Leite Soares, 30.11.1995, 
https://arquivo.trf1.jus.br/PesquisaMenuArquivo.asp?p1=9501326675&pA=9501326675&pN=284644
519954010000. 
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diseases and other health problems, and the universal and equal access to 
actions and services for its promotion, protection and recovery.”93 The 
Constitution also designed a hierarchical system of public policies 
concerning heath care that relied on shared responsibilities among the 
Union, the states, and the municipalities.94 
Brazilian constitutional scholars argue that the entrenchment of socio-
economic rights in the 1988 Constitution built a legal framework that 
favored the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights.95 They agree 
that including those rights in the Constitution induced a shift in 
jurisprudence in the 1990s, since mere programs were elevated to 
justiciable entitlements.96 However, it is important to link this circumstance 
to a broader constitutional and institutional context. 
The 1988 Constitution assumed a transformative role.97 After a 
traumatic two-decade military dictatorship, the drafters implemented a 
liberal democracy. The change in regime resulted from a slow political 
process with massive popular engagement.98 Until the 1980s, constitutional 
texts had limited importance in the Brazilian legal culture; they were 
considered as mere political texts that set off the power structures but 
lacked normative strength.99 The political elites historically had no 
commitment to maintaining values that reflected the actual aspirations of 
the constituent power. Successive changes of political control were 
coupled with successive constitutions (in 1824, 1891, 1934, 1937, 1946, 
and 1967). Every new group that controlled the government built its own 
discipline of power to support its own political convenience.100 
In context, a very specific ambition governed the process of drafting 
the 1988 Constitution: the new regime would break this pattern. Re-
implementing a democratic regime represented a symbol of a set of hopes 
from the constituent power. The promulgated text articulated the model 
that the Brazilian society intended to become: a strong regime of liberties 
and social rights focused on enhancing equality and reducing poverty, 
grounded on a liberal market economy. Raising the Constitution to an 
 
 
93 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 196 (Braz.) (transl. by author). 
94  See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 198 (Braz.). 
95  See Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 25, at 101-04. 
96  Id. at 108, 111-23. 
97  For a discussion of the transformative nature of constitutions, see Karl E. Klare, Legal 
Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism, 14 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 146 (1998).  
98  See Frances Hagopian & Scott Mainwaring, Democracy in Brazil: Problems and Prospects, 
4.3 WORLD POL’Y J. 485, 485-86 (1987). 
99  See LUIS ROBERTO BARROSO, CURSO DE DIREITO CONSTITUCIONAL CONTEMPORÂNEO 100 
(7th ed. 2018).    
100 See Hagopian & Mainwaring, supra note 98. 
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aspirational project of the people themselves was the perfect strategy to 
engage society in supporting the new regime, and thus to enhance its 
legitimacy. The result was a 250-article text that touched almost every 
aspect of the political, social, and economic spheres to target Brazil’s 
entire multicultural population, and to guarantee that its members were 
truly represented.  
Therefore, Brazilian legal thought faced a transition: since society 
recognized the promulgated text as a picture of their highest aspirations, it 
accepted the constitution as a prior source of normativity and a guide for 
interpreting its political morality. Constitutional law then arose as a central 
field among legal topics: no single legal rule and principle could violate 
the constitutional norms.101 Under those circumstances, the American and 
the German doctrine of constitutional supremacy became very influential 
in Brazil. All the legal microsystems (civil law, criminal law, taxation, 
etc.) were “constitutionalized,” meaning their traditional canons–based on 
the Roman system–were reviewed under the new premises of the 
aspirational democratic project (welfare state, protection of fundamental 
rights, democratic government, and dignity of the human being as 
foundational values of the state).  
Linking this legal framework to the institutional arrangements reveals a 
paradox: the transformative constitution was followed neither by a change 
of the controlling political groups nor by the structural reforms that the 
aspirational project demanded.  
On the one hand, the new regime strengthened the fundamental rights–
civil liberties and socio-economic rights. The Constitution raised human 
dignity to a foundational principle and announced that the reduction of 
inequality and poverty was the central focus of the government. A clear 
movement to benefit the most disadvantaged through redistributive 
policies fed a hope for structural reforms. 
On the other hand, unlike other Latin American transitions to 
democracy, no consistent political rupture between the former and the new 
regime took place in Brazil. As Frances Hagopian recalls in an essay on 
the prospects of this new format of government, the first civil President, 
Sarney, and other prominent politicians had served the authoritarian 
regime.102 The same elites continued to command the political institutions 
 
 
101 See LUIS ROBERTO BARROSO, NEOCONSTITUCIONALISMO E CONSTITUCIONALIZAÇÃO DO 
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under democracy and strongly resisted a transition to more progressive 
social policies. 103  The new democratic frame of government was filled 
with traditional non-democratic political practices and arrangements on 
behalf of so-called stability of the country. This structure, consolidated 
behind the scenes and shielded by the rhetorical discourses of change, 
“impede[d] the transformation of institutions necessary for a consolidated 
democracy, discourage[d] popular participation in politics, and thwart[ed] 
policy changes that might upset an extremely inegalitarian social order.”104 
Additionally, political parties failed to represent popular aspirations 
and ideals, which led to Congress’ political fragility that has vigorously 
persisted since 1988. Hagopian denounces the use of governing parties by 
traditional political elites to maintain the local power, as local elites have 
commanded political parties and systematically neglected society’s 
needs.105 Popular support has been obtained through small-scale political 
favors and bargains, the so omnipresent clientelism.106 
Hagopian offered a precise diagnosis: “in the first two years of 
democratic government, there has been no indication that Brazil’s parties 
are becoming effective instruments for formulating policy democratically 
or representing nonelite interests.”107 Although this was written in 1987, it 
could accurately describe the political context from then until now.  
David Landau reached a similar conclusion in describing the 
Colombian political context. A dysfunctional legislative branch, a 
fragmented party system, and a strong executive branch–with decree 
power108–formed an amalgam that favored the Colombian Congress to 
abdicate its power of both designing policy programs and checking 
executive policies. This same description applies to Brazil. In 2015, thirty-
five parties were officially registered in the Superior Electoral Court, 
many with elected representatives in Congress.109 Parties have been 
identified according to their respective controlling groups rather than to 
their programs, since their number has undermined any reasonable 
correlation between political ideologies and party platforms.110 As a result 
 
 
103 Id. at 485-86. 
104 Id. at 486. 
105 Id. at 495. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 See David Landau, Political Institutions and Judicial Role in Comparative Constitutional 
Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 319, 337 (2010). 
109 Partidos políticos registrados no TSE, TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR ELEITORAL, 
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of this weak legislature, the executive branch has proposed the most 
important bills and constitutional amendments passed by the Congress 
during the democratic period.  
All these legal and institutional arrangements are vital for 
understanding the role that the Brazilian courts assumed under the 
democratic system. Brazilian scholars have generally taken a legal 
perspective in analyzing the expansion of judicial power in liberal 
democracies. However, an inquiry into the interaction of the political 
players presents deeper evidence to explain how the context favored 
certain behaviors and how they can be addressed. 
Constitutions alone do not produce constitutional culture. Legal norms 
are only an arm of the sociological framework that defines institutional 
patterns and players’ interactions.  The allocation of power, social norms, 
and even the market are also focal points that emit incentives and 
disincentives that influence players.111  
In the Brazilian case, the general argument that entrenching socio-
economic rights in the 1988 Constitution induced their strong judicial 
enforcement is true but incomplete, for two reasons. First, not only the 
entrenchment of rights, but also the voluntary entrenchment of powerful 
courts helped to build this legal framework. Second, judicial activism 
seems to be a response to an institutional context formed by a huge gap 
between the transformative constitution and the failure of the political 
system in solidifying its whole aspirational project.112 Courts had to learn 
how to handle those adverse factors as a matter of balancing the 
asymmetric correlation of powers. The next subsection will delve deeper 
into those two arguments. 
2.3. Reconnecting the dots: the judicial role under institutional 
arrangements 
The mainstream analyses of the Brazilian judicial role are usually 
disconnected from any context-based explanation and from comparisons 
with developing countries’ experiences. This section attempts to draw 
some lines to reconnect these dots, using a genealogical approach. 
Brazilian courts played a deferential role in the early years after the 
1988 Constitution. This attitude is noticeable not only regarding socio-
economic rights, but also regarding most claims for interventions in the 
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legislative and the executive branches. Courts took great care not to 
intervene in the other powers; judges practiced a neutral role by relying on 
the separation of powers clause. 
The history of the writ of injunction is a clear example of the 
movement from a deferential towards an activist role. The 1988 Brazilian 
Constitution instituted a specific action for cases in which the absence of 
regulation prevents citizens from exercising constitutional rights regarding 
nationality, sovereignty and citizenship.113 The first opinions delivered by 
the Supreme Court in such actions remained deferential and dialogic. 
Albeit recognizing constitutional violations due to the absence of rights 
regulation, the court merely notified the competent agency to address the 
issue.  
In 1991, the case of Alfredo Ribeiro Daudt v. Federal Union and 
National Congress was the first movement towards an incisive behavior.114 
Article 8 of the Provisional Norms of the 1988 Constitution (an appendix 
of the constitution) recognized a right to receive compensation for 
damages due to some specific restrictions imposed by the Air Force during 
the military dictatorship. The norm also stipulated a one-year deadline for 
the Congress to regulate this right.115 However, two years passed without 
Congress having accomplished its task. The Supreme Court then decided 
to adopt a stronger remedy to protect the normativity of the constitutional 
norms, and imposed a sixty-day deadline to Congress to approve the 
necessary regulation.116 The Justices designed the so-called normative 
remedies, by which courts could command the inactive branch to pass the 
required regulation, instead of simply notifying it.117 
The court varied between notifications and normative remedies until 
the 2007 case of Education Workers Union v. National Congress, in which 
it adopted a stronger remedy under a political context of recurrent 
legislative omission.118 In this case, the issue was the lack of regulation of 
 
 
113 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 5 § LXXI (Braz.). 
114 S.T.F., MI 283, Relator: Sepulveda Pertence, 20.03.1991, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 14.11.1991 (Braz.), 
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarConsolidada.asp?classe=MI&numero=283&origem=AP. 
115 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] Ato das Disposições Constitucionais Transitórias art. 8 § 3 
(Braz.). 
116 S.T.F., MI 283, Relator: Sepulveda Pertence, 20.03.1991, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 14.11.1991, 46 (Braz.), 
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarConsolidada.asp?classe=MI&numero=283&origem=AP. 
117 See generally id. 
118 See S.T.F., MI 708, Relator: Min. Gilmar Mendes, 25.10.2007, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL 
FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 30.10.2008 (Braz.), 
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Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
526 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW     [VOL. 18:493 
 
 
 
 
the social right to strike granted to civil servants. The 1988 Constitution 
stated that civil servants had the same social rights as the private sector 
workers, including the right to strike,119 and attributed to Congress the duty 
of regulating the right. However, twenty years passed without Congress 
having accomplished its duty, preventing workers from lawfully 
exercising a fundamental social right. The Supreme Court had judged the 
same issue four times: once in 1996 (case 20),120 and three times in 2002 
(cases 485, 585 and 631).121 In all these occasions, it had acted deferentially 
by merely recognizing the lack of regulation and asking Congress to pass 
the required bill. 
However, in 2007, the Supreme Court had grown frustrated with 
Congress ignoring the Court’s holdings. The Supreme Court, recognizing 
the importance of enforcing social rights, decided that regulations for 
private sector workers had to be exceptionally applied to civil servants 
until Congress accomplished its task.122 This new remedy inaugurated a 
paradigm of the writ of injunction and inspired resolution for other cases.  
Those examples provide a comprehensive picture of the political 
context that induced courts to abandon a deferential and dialogic role that 
was common until the early 1990s. The change was made in order to 
develop strong remedies to address recurring omissions by the other 
branches. One may list several other reasons to support this movement: the 
profile of the Justices and judges appointed during the 1990s; the rise of 
the Public Prosecution Office and the Public Defense as independent 
institutions; the recognition of collective rights and the implementation of 
class actions; and the prominence achieved by the Constitutional doctrine, 
among others. One cause cannot explain such a very complex 
phenomenon. However, one must not disregard that decades of widespread 
 
 
119 See CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] art. 37 §§ VI, VII (Braz.). 
120 See S.T.F., MI 20, Relator: Celso de Mello, 19.05.1994, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 22.11.1996 (Braz.), 
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121 See S.T.F., MI 485, Relator: Mauricio Correa, 25.04.2002, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL 
JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 23.08.2002 (Braz.), 
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[S.T.F.J.], 02.08.2002 (Braz.), 
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarConsolidada.asp?classe=MI&numero=585&origem=AP; 
S.T.F., MI 631, Relator: Ilmar Galvao, 16.08.2000, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCIA 
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public demand coupled with the state’s recalcitrant failure galvanized 
judges to undertake more ardent measures to address socio-economic 
rights. Thus, a weak Congress that could not accomplish its constitutional 
duties, a fragile party system, and a fragmented political system, 
constituted an environment that favored an atypical interaction between 
those institutions and courts. Eventually, as in Colombia, Brazilian courts 
assumed a legislative role and built strong remedies as a matter of 
preserving the normativity of the Constitution and of their own decisions.  
The earliest significant cases on the right to health after the 1988 
Constitution asked for injunctions of adequate treatment and drugs for 
HIV/AIDS patients. The first claims were brought in 1996.123 The high 
percentage of concessive decisions and the support of NGOs pressured the 
government to design a universal policy covering free treatments for 
HIV/AIDS-patients. The success of the HIV/AIDS-related litigation had a 
side effect though; other health-related claims arose in the early 2000s. 
Hoffman explains that at the Rio de Janeiro State Court, “up to 1998, 
HIV/AIDS-related drugs amounted to more than 90 percent of actions, a 
figure that . . . dropped to just less than 15 percent by 2000.”124 Scholars 
interpret the success of the HIV/AIDS-related claims in the late 1990s as 
an incentive to health-care-related litigation: patients noticed that courts 
would be an effective shortcut to enforce rights.125 
The necessity of guaranteeing the transformative constitutional project, 
coupled with the state’s failure to universalize public policies, replaced the 
previous discourse of the programmatic character of social rights. Since 
then, a broad range of rulings all over the country ordered the government 
to materialize constitutional promises, not only on the right to health, but 
on all other socio-economic rights: construction of schools and hospitals in 
poor villages, instatement of social security benefits, and installation of 
electricity in rural areas, among others. All of those examples are in fact 
symptoms of a deep change of the judicial role after the 1988 Constitution. 
Ran Hirschl lists the four traditional theories that explain the expansion 
of the judicial power in liberal democracies.126 The democratic proliferation 
thesis links the entrenchment of rights and strong forms of judicial review 
 
 
123 Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 25, at 122 (citing MARIO SCHEFFER, ANDEA LAZZARINI 
SALAZAR, & KARINA BOZOLA GRAU, O REMÉDIO VIA JUSTIÇA: UM ESTUDO SOBRE O ACESSO A 
NOVOS MEDICAMENTOS E EXAMES EM HIV/AIDS NO BRASIL POR AEIO DE AÇÕES JUDICIAIS (2005)). 
124 See Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 25, at 122. 
125 See id. 
126 Ran Hirschl, The Political Origins of the New Constitutionalism, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL 
STUD. 71, 73 (2004). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
528 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW     [VOL. 18:493 
 
 
 
 
in constitutions, and the development of relatively independent judiciaries 
to the strengthening of democratic regimes. Powerful constitutional courts 
have arisen in new democracies in Southern Europe (1970s), Latin 
America (1980s), and in Central and Eastern Europe (1990s).127 The 
evolutionist theory relies on the counter-majoritarian character of the 
judicial activity as an advanced stage of the democracy to justify the 
increasing power of the courts. The functionalist explanation states that 
powerful courts are an organic reaction to dysfunctional political systems. 
The institutional economics model “sees the development of constitutions 
and judicial review as mechanisms to mitigate systemic collective actions 
concerns such as commitment, enforcement, and information problems.”128 
Then, Hirschl proposes a new explanation, the so-called strategic 
approach thesis, which suggests that “power holders may profit from an 
expansion of the judicial power,”129 since “delegating policy-making 
authority to the courts may be an effective means of reducing the decision-
making costs, as well as shifting responsibility and thereby reducing the 
risks to themselves and to the institutional apparatus within which they 
operate.”130 Therefore, from his perspective, the deferential role played by 
the executive and the legislative branches in favor of the courts is self-
conscious and actor-oriented, rather than a mere result of a random, 
organic malfunctioning of institutional arrangements.  
To this end Hirschl recalls that transitions to democracy are commonly 
linked to the entrenchment of rights and judicial empowerment. In 
moments of political uncertainty–such as regime changes–threatened 
political elites strategically entrench their policy preferences in legal 
norms and expand the power of the courts “against the changing fortunes 
of the democratic politics.”131 Since their political status is uncertain under 
the regime about to start, 1) entrenching rights in the constitution 
preserves their political, social, and economic agenda, and 2) giving power 
to unelected and impartial bodies locks in their project in the long term, as 
well as reduces the power of future governments, which might be 
controlled by other political elites.132 
It is important to reevaluate Brazil’s evolution under Hirschl. The 1998 
Constitution, beyond introducing a strong bill of rights, unprecedentedly 
 
 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 82. 
129 Id. at 84. 
130 Id. at 84-85. 
131 Id. at 98. 
132 Id. at 89. 
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expanded judicial power to unprecedented levels by reinforcing the 
already strong judicial review of previous constitutions. Subsequent 
amendments in 1992 and in 2004 enlarged the judicial power even more 
by introducing new forms of review and more flexible remedies, as well as 
by introducing a system of precedents. This legal framework, which was 
an oriented objective of both the constituent and the constituted power, 
matched an environment of courts seeking legitimacy and power. 
Institutional arrangements disclosed a context within which political 
actors repeatedly bring political issues to courts as a shortcut to reduce 
political opportunity costs and decision-making process frictions, which 
also happens in the case of socio-economic rights. Brazilian scholars 
denounce the fact that judges have guided the health care programs; 
however, from time to time, the government expands the list of services 
and drugs provided by the public system regarding the contents of the 
rulings delivered by courts, such as in the HIV/AIDS cases. Thus, medical 
services and medicines that became commonly awarded as in the claims 
are then universalized in the public system, as if the litigation on health 
care were the perfect picture of the current demands and the perfect guide 
of the expansion that state programs shall take. 
However, this attitude of the government seems to be conscious rather 
than random. Adopting the content of the lawsuits as a picture of the 
current demands for services is a shortcut that actually reduces the costs 
and the risks of the decision-making process that the executive officials 
would have to adopt in order to define the goals of the public programs. 
Therefore, the deferential behavior exhibited by state officials matches 
the interest of courts “seeking to increase [their] symbolic power and 
international prestige, by fostering [their] alignment with a growth 
community of liberal democratic nations engaged in judicial review and 
right-based discourses.”133 Institutions naturally engage in their tasks by 
trying to accomplish their job in the best possible way regarding their own 
perspectives. As Foucault said, power has purposes and aims.134 For this 
reason, appealing to judges’ self-constraint sounds like a problematic idea: 
under liberal democracy, non-elected officials seek legitimacy and act 
strategically to achieve it. This point will be developed in the next 
sections. 
In sum, addressing the mis-enforcement of socio-economic rights 
 
 
133 Id. at 97. 
134 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOLUME 1: AN INTRODUCTION 95 
(Robert Hurley trans., Vintage Books ed., 1990) (1976). 
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requires struggling with actual institutional arrangements. Debiting the 
judicial activism solely from the account of the courts does not provide a 
complete picture of how political, social and economic forces and counter-
forces work to impact courts and their decisions, and how issues that arise 
from this interaction should be fixed. 
2.4. Democracy through the courts? 
In the last section, a short genealogy of the enforcement of socio-
economic rights in Brazil found evidence that links the democratic 
political context to the activist judicial role gradually assumed by courts. 
The analysis concluded that an oriented process of constitutionalizing 
rights and of strong judicial review created the perfect conditions for a 
feedback process in which strategic deference by the executive and the 
legislative branches matched courts’ openness to expand their own power. 
In order to fill the deficit of the constitutional normativity caused by other 
political institutions’ malfunction, courts have increasingly assumed the 
role of other players. This was a dysfunctional solution for a dysfunctional 
context. There is no emptiness of power. This movement has changed the 
courts’ perspectives about their duties and powers. The way that socio-
economic rights have been enforced is just a sharp symptom of this whole 
phenomenon. Eventually, the actual interaction of the political institutions 
within the context of forces and counter-forces disputing spaces of power 
must be considered. 
This Article sheds light on the general arguments on judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. The evidence doubted the 
hegemony of both: judicial enforcement may reduce and worsen 
inequality, may improve or defeat the distribution of goods, and thus may 
enhance or weaken democracy.135 
In this section, this Article argues that there is no necessary connection 
between the level of review and mis-enforcement, although sometimes 
 
 
135 I emphasize the concept of democracy according to Amartya Sen, developed in The Idea of 
Justice, which goes beyond the idea of public reasoning:  
Democracy is assessed in terms of public reasoning . . . , which leads to an understanding of 
democracy as government by discussion . . . . But democracy must also be seen more 
generally in terms of the capacity to enrich reasoned engagement through enhancing 
informational availability and the feasibility of interactive discussions. Democracy has to be 
judged not just by the institutions that formally exist but by the extent to which different 
voices from diverse sections of the people can actually be heard. 
AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, XIII (2014).  
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they may be contingently related. This means that, under the current 
institutional arrangements, strong judicial review does not necessarily lead 
to mis-enforcement, and weak review may lead to mis-enforcement in a 
number of situations. 
Within an abstract and ideal frame of separation of powers in a 
democratic regime, weak judicial review seems an appropriate model for 
the judicial role. The elected branches are backed by a well-functioning 
political system. Courts play a lateral counter-majoritarian role, which 
constitutes their proper democratic duty. Judicial enforcement of rights is 
deferential and exceptional. Executive and legislative institutions 
immediately and substantially respond to courts’ requests. If a court 
recognizes a violation of rights and notifies an agency, officials undertake 
the measures to fix the issue. Congress assumes a high degree of 
representativeness and influences the design of public policies. This ideal 
picture covers what Kim Lane Scheppele calls the standard proceduralist 
assumption, according to which institutions are democratic in content if 
they are democratic in form.136  
A comparison between this ideal model and any other real cases would 
lead to the conclusion that the latter sounds undemocratic and under-
inclusive. Any design distinct from the ideal model would be taken as a 
mistake rather than an invitation to rethink and to understand this frame. 
However, comparisons among real models in actual institutional 
arrangements would lead to different conclusions. Instead of blaming a 
deviation model and putting it aside, this work attempts to understand and 
unveil the real structures that create it. If the deviation model does not 
produce the same outputs that the ideal model does and takes a different 
and irreconcilable path, it is important to understand why such a gap 
exists. Before reforming the system to achieve the ideal frame, the inquiry 
would be whether the actual institutional arrangements make it feasible to 
undertake traditional solutions. In other words, the question is whether 
cutting off the system of review in order to restrain courts from adopting 
strong remedies would really enhance democracy.  
The answer is negative. Under the Brazilian pattern, weak remedies are 
not always an efficient feature through which courts can satisfy their main 
role in a democratic regime, i.e., to serve as a check on the government. 
 
 
136 Kim Lane Scheppele, Democracy by Judiciary (Or Why Courts Can Sometimes Be More 
Democratic Than Parliaments), in RETHINKING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER COMMUNISM 25, 30 (Adam 
Czarnota et al. eds., 2005); see also William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can 
Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1294-95 (2006). 
https://law.wustl.edu/harris/conferences/constitutionalconf/ScheppelePaper.pdf.  
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Weak judicial review as a general rule would incentivize a lack of 
enforcement, since executive and legislative branches have proven not to 
adequately respond to the commands of the courts. Unjustified aggregate 
and distributive impacts that may worsen inequality would also arise.  
For instance, we could assume that the rulings enforcing the right to 
health had been replaced by deferential remedies. In this situation, the 
court would merely notify the state that a violation of the right to health 
had been noticed. An exercise of prediction leads to the conclusion that the 
state would likely ignore those commands. Inertia as a response to 
violation of rights is perverse. On the one hand, the sum of the similar 
rulings would constitute an aggregate effect consisting in a sum of 
violations. On the other hand, as the court would not exercise the counter-
majoritarian task before a violation of rights, the maintenance of a status 
of inequality would constitute an indirect distributive effect.   
Therefore, whenever political institutions do not function properly due 
to structural obstacles, a situation of oriented under-enforcement may also 
cause a deficit of democracy and a violation of the counter-majoritarian 
principle. Fallon’s argument, that “it is morally more troublesome for 
fundamental rights to be underenforced than overenforced,” reinforces this 
idea.137 
This does not mean that a deferential role may not be adopted in any 
case whatsoever. Choosing between two extremes is not required. Under a 
system of strong review, remedies that are weak, intermediate, or strong 
are available to courts to enforce rights. Judges will consult these options 
and pick the most appropriate remedy given the arrangements of players 
involved in the case. Judicial intervention must be as low as possible to 
achieve its purposes, but not necessarily either deferential or 
interventional. 
Additionally, it is not true that strong remedies weaken democracy in 
all situations. Scheppele challenges this proceduralist approach by 
analyzing the Hungary case.138 In the 1990s, the Hungary Constitutional 
 
 
137 Fallon, supra note 15, at 1735. 
138 Kim Scheppele states: 
In many ways the Hungarian Constitutional Court turned out to be a more democratic 
institution than the Hungarian Parliament was for a number of structural and historical 
reasons. To see how this process worked, I will take up in more detail the most pressing and 
controversial set of cases that arose for both the Parliament and the Constitutional Court in 
the mid-1990s because it is in the interplay between Parliament and the Constitutional Court 
in specific cases that one can see why the Court was arguably more democratic than the 
Parliament. In the example I will discuss, the “Bokros package cases,” the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions were critically important because the shape of the transition hung on the 
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Court adopted strong remedies when intervening in the other branches by 
declaring laws unconstitutional and by guiding state policies. Although 
this case would be taken as a grave deviation under the proceduralist 
approach, Scheppele finds that the court’s behavior enhanced democracy. 
According to her, “[t]he standard democratic story presumes standard 
democratic institutions and a certain set of pre-existing democratic values 
guaranteed by prior political struggles among the relevant sources of 
power, neither of which Hungary had.”139 She then describes the conditions 
of the Hungarian political system, mainly the weak party system and the 
misalignment between voters’ expectations and governmental 
achievements.140 The Constitutional Court, rather than Parliament, assumed 
the duty to protect rights and thus attempted to ensure a set of substantive 
commitments directed to policy.141 For this reason, Scheppele argues that 
the Constitutional Court enhanced Hungarian democracy. 
India has faced similar issues. Its Supreme Court has developed a 
jurisprudence of strong and innovative remedies and has gained the 
deference of the executive and the legislative branches. Professor 
Mansfield cites the epistolary jurisdiction,142 the expanded rules of 
standing,143 the socio-legal commissions,144 and monitoring145 as examples of 
features that the court adopted under the public interest litigation. It 
achieved high levels of judicial activism but is nationally recognized as a 
protector of rights. According to Professor Sathe, “the general population 
and political players believe that in matters involving conflict between 
various competing interests, the courts are better arbiters than 
politicians.”146 
 
 
answer. 
Scheppele, supra note 136, at 45. 
139 Id. at 51. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 41-45. 
142 “‘Epistolary jurisdiction,’ according to which the Supreme Court of India (as well as other 
courts) could ‘convert a letter from a member of the public into a writ petition.’” VICKI JACKSON & 
MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 751 (3d ed. 2014). See also Jamie Cassels, 
Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting the Impossible?, 37 AM. J. COM. 
L. 495, 513 (1989). 
143 “Expanded rules of standing, under which ‘any member of the public or social action group 
acting bona fide’ can file a request for relief on behalf of others who do not have the ability to do so 
for themselves.” JACKSON & TUSHNET, supra note 142, at 751. 
144 “Judicial appointment of outsiders as ‘Court Commissioners’ or ‘sociolegal commissions’ to 
investigate facts and make recommendations.” Id. 
145 “In cases involving prison conditions, bonded laborers, ‘pavement dwellers’ . . ., rickshaw 
pullers and ‘dalits,’ members of the so called ‘untouchable’ castes or of ‘other backward classes,’ or 
‘advasis’ . . . .” Id. 
146 S. P. Sathe, Judicial Activism: The Indian Experience, 6 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 29, 89 
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Regarding the Colombia case, Landau also reaches similar conclusions: 
“because Colombian parties are unstable and poorly tied to civil society, 
the Colombian Congress has difficulty initiating policy, monitoring the 
enforcement of policy, and checking presidential power.”147 This political 
environment favored courts to take executive and legislative functions. 
Therefore, he claims that any evaluation of the Courts’ outputs should be 
“based on whether it is helping to achieve constitutional transformation, 
moving Colombian politics and society closer to the order envisioned in 
the 1991 text.”148 Under this criterion, the court has been relatively 
successful in handling a dysfunctional political system in order to achieve 
the constitutional goals. 
Therefore, I rely on those examples to argue that any proceduralist 
approach alone should be rejected to address the Brazilian case. Mis-
enforcement of rights has no necessary connection with either over-
enforcement or under-enforcement of rights, although in some situations 
they may be contingently related. As both over- and under-enforcement 
may lead to mis-enforcement of rights, the discussion should be 
reoriented, since the causes of the blamed negative effects of the judicial 
enforcement do not necessarily derive from the level of enforcement. 
Thus, discussing judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights cannot be 
narrowed to deciding between weak and strong review. Under the 
Brazilian institutional arrangements–which are reproduced in other 
developing countries, such as Colombia, South Africa, and India–there is 
no feasibility to adopt weak review as a unique and general constitutional 
choice.  
Achieving constitutional transformation through judicial review 
requires accepting the idea that courts may assume different forms of 
engagement–not only the American models of judicial activism or 
minimalism149–and still substantially enhance democracy. It also requires 
adding new vectors beyond the level of review. Besides the strength of the 
injunction, its own substance matters, as long as it is framed with 
 
 
(2001). 
147 See Landau, supra note 108.  
148 Id. at 376. 
149 I call attention to the fact that, although for different reasons, Brazilian courts have ended up 
adopting the model of judicial activism that American judges have been developing since the 1950s. 
The supremacy of American legal thought since that time has induced courts around the world to 
perceive and to incorporate a judicial behavior that relied on more intervention in the other branches’ 
activities, a strong pattern of judicial review, and law-making activity. Regarding the three 
globalizations of the law, see Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19-73 (David Trubek & 
Alvaro Santos eds., 2006).  
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reference to three points. The first is the commitment to a conception of 
enforcement that takes into account substantive issues more likely to erupt 
in socio-economic rights–such as needs and the beneficiaries. The second 
is a capacity to address background rules that also interfere with the 
dynamics of enforcement–such as the distributive and aggregate effects. 
The third is whether its scope embodies a procedure that enhances 
democracy. This issue will be explored in the next section. 
3. A DESIGN APPROACH: SOME GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPMENT 
 3.1. Justification of a design approach 
The third section of this Article an invitation to institutional reflection. 
It stems from a challenge that Fallon presented in his article, The Core of 
an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review. According to him, liberal political 
theory does accommodate judicial review. The idea that political 
legitimacy may derive from substantive moral ends defeats the argument 
that unelected independent bodies are unable to work democratically. This 
outcome-based premise proposes  
that a system of judicial review can be so designed in a manner that 
allows for the total moral costs of the overenforcement of rights that 
judicial review would likely produce will be become lower than the 
moral costs that would result from the underenforcement of rights 
that would likely occur in the absence of judicial review.150 
This paper accepts Fallon’s challenge and proposes the design 
approach. The previous sections sustained that the dualism minimalism 
versus usurpation furnishes an incomplete–but still necessary–account of 
the mis-enforcement of socio-economic rights. In this section, I build on 
this argument to propose some theoretical and practical guidelines that 
may reorient the debate.  
Most Brazilian scholars take the health-related litigation as a deviation 
that courts should abolish. As the traditional litigation model seems not to 
accommodate the issues that arise from those cases, or seems to produce 
undesirable results, a feeling of rejection emerges. Instead of trying to 
understand the actual structures of those issues, scholars repudiate the 
whole enterprise and attempt to find solutions through a retrospective 
exercise by looking at past contexts–even when the problem has not yet 
 
 
150 Fallon, supra note 15, at 1713-1714.  
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been set–in order to see how structures worked previously.151 However, 
regressions are useful if one eye simultaneously looks prospectively. 
Sustaining law as a closed, gapless, and dead system produces no 
transformation: anomalies tend to persist, legal thinkers overlook and 
misunderstand the structures of the litigation system, and eventually 
institutions lose legitimacy.152 
Judicial review aims not only to maintain fundamental values 
entrenched in the constitution, but also to build the transformation that 
constitutions have desired regarding the powers and the constraints 
imposed by the constituent power. In the Brazilian case, the transformative 
1988 Constitution mostly infused a sense of ambition in democracy, which 
may be enhanced by judges as long as they demonstrate commitment to 
this project under the counter-majoritarian principle. The ultimate purpose 
of the Brazilian judicial review system is to enhance democracy. 
Therefore, this Article argues that enforcement of socio-economic 
rights through mechanisms of judicial review is legitimate as long as it has 
a commitment to protect rights as well as to enhance equality. It includes 
not necessarily providing claimants with services, but effectively making 
political institutions adhere to their constitutional duties.153 It requires 
courts to inquire beyond rights and legal interests: when legal norms and 
principles do not provide a unique choice–and the judge encounters the 
normative penumbra–social outcomes and background rules become an 
important source of criteria to define how rights should be framed and 
enforced. The counter-majoritarian judicial role and the equality-based 
purpose provide an additional task of improving the distribution of basic 
goods in favor of disadvantaged groups. It does not mean that judicial 
review shall be reduced to this standard. Nevertheless, such a substantive 
commitment would reinforce the project of the 1988 Constitution beyond 
all the formalist requirements of judicial intervention. Achieving all of 
these objectives demands a reflection on the general conceptions of 1) 
public law litigation, and of 2) democratic judicial roles, which aspects I 
describe in the next section. 
 3.2. Theoretical background for a design approach 
 
 
151 See sources cited supra note 92. 
152 See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE UNIVERSAL HISTORY OF THE LEGAL THOUGHT 
(2015), http://www.robertounger.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/the-universal-history-of-legal-
thought.pdf. 
153 See David Landau, A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1501, 1512-13 
(2014). 
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The general question that a design approach proposes is how courts 
may produce more justice in socio-economic-rights-related litigation. 
Narrowing this question to a concrete level means to ask how the 
components of the judicial review system– procedures, remedies, levels of 
scrutiny, litigation system, among others–will be designed to ensure that 
their substantive moral outcomes will reflect the values of the 
transformative constitution. 
It is possible to address those questions in two different manners. On 
one hand, a Rawlsian perspective aims at imagining perfect just social 
arrangements as a basic social structure designed under the reflective 
interaction of a set of principles of fairness.154 This model demands–and 
presupposes–integral adherence of the people to this operating structure, as 
if there were no deviation from the prescribed plan. On the other hand, my 
choice lies in Sen’s approach of “making evaluative comparisons over 
distinct social realizations.”155 Although both perspectives are analytically 
linked with one another in important topics, this article adheres to Sen’s 
proposal, in the sense that 1) obtaining concrete diagnosis of injustice, 2) 
identifying remediable injustices, and 3) verifying whether a specific 
social change is capable of  bringing more justice constitute a feasible plan 
to address the mis-enforcement of rights and its vicissitudes.156 The mis-
enforcement itself is a deviation from the formalist plan of a perfect 
judicial review system within a perfect liberal democracy. Thus, it could 
never be fixed under the former perspective.157 Eventually, this work’s 
 
 
154 John Rawls, in discussing his general idea of justice, provides that  
[m]y aim is to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level 
of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract as found, say, in Locke, Rousseau, and 
Kant. In order to do this we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular 
society or to set up a particular form of government. Rather, the guiding idea is that the 
principles of justice for the basic structure of society are object of the original agreement. 
They are the principles that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests 
would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their 
association. 
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 10 (Harv. Univ. Press 1999) (1971). 
155  SEN, supra note 135, at 410. 
156  Id. at ix. 
157  Sen, refusing to follow the transcendental institutionalism approach, stated that 
[i]ndeed, the theory of justice, as formulated under the currently dominant transcendental 
institutionalism, reduces many of the most relevant issues of justice into empty – even if 
acknowledged to be well-meant – rhetoric. When people across the world agitate to get more 
global justice – and I emphasize here the comparative word ‘more’ – they are not clamoring 
for some kind of minimal humanitarianism. Nor are they agitating for a perfectly just world 
society, but merely to enhance global justice, as Adam Smith, or Condorcet or Mary 
Wollstonecraft did in their own time, and on which agreements can be generated through 
public discussion, despite a continuing divergence of views on others matters. 
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objective focuses on “advancing – rather than perfecting – both global 
democracy and global justice.”158 
This central idea leads to the following eight background premises that 
support the enterprise of designing structures to improve the case of 
judicial enforcement concerning socio-economic rights. They derive from 
the empirical and analytical enterprise on which this work relied, as well 
as from the scholarship of other constitutionalists that have already been 
trying to reorient the debate of judicial review–especially those who have 
been sensitive to the dysfunctional democracy-related issues.159 
First, judicial role is contextual. Rather than arenas, courts are non-
central players that interact with other institutions within relations of 
power and reason, “two elements in ongoing and dynamic tension with 
each other.”160 Descriptively, both institutional arrangements and normative 
commitments form an architecture that constrains judges’ outputs. The 
former induces courts seeking for legitimacy to strategically predict, 
calculate, anticipate, and reduce their impact against other players. The 
latter consists of a structure that delimits procedures and judgments and 
imposes the duty of justification under specific rational criteria and 
internal coherence. Judicial review can be reduced neither to power nor to 
reason alone.161 
Second, achieving substantive ends requires courts and parties to 
consider the context–power and structure–within which they interact, and 
thus to explicitly address informal rules (or background rules). For 
instance, aggregate and distributive effects in health-related litigation are 
outcomes from a second code of norms (formal norms are the first code) 
that directly impact the substantive results of the rulings, either enhancing 
or weakening equality. Different types of informal rules may arise and 
should be recognized as elements that influence the interaction and the 
results of the operative institutions. Legal norms are only one part of a 
broad range of sources that impact social phenomena. Economic, social, 
political, and psychological elements, among others, become important 
circumstances of reasoning when players encounter the penumbra of open-
 
 
Id. at 26. 
158 Id. at xii. 
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160 Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Empiricism, Experimentalism, and Conditional Theory, 
67 SMU L. REV. 141, 151 (2014). 
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REVIEW (1980). 
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textured legal norms.162 All of the political bodies and parties involved in 
the process should consider them to obtain a comprehensive picture of the 
issue at stake.  
Third, the judiciary is not a unique and uniform body, but a sum of 
individual and collective minds.163 It means that this work does not intend 
to prescribe a particular path of correct interpretation nor an approach for 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. Absolute judicial coordination is 
unfeasible and undesirable. Asking courts to address informal rules, 
context-based arguments, and distinct languages does not guarantee that 
judges’ interpretations and outputs will always coincide, or even that the 
desirable result of enhancing equality will always be achieved. Judicial 
practice comprises widespread disagreement and instability. The purpose 
is to design a framework that would constrain, expand, and guide legal 
reasoning. Note that the concept of mis-enforcement of rights adopts the 
characteristic non-justified distributive and aggregative effects. This detail 
evidences the concern with the epistemological coherence of each judicial 
output alone, rather than a desire to achieve a unified body of rulings. A 
logically articulated set of clear premises and conclusions allows for 
appropriate understanding and control by other players and institutions, a 
circumstance that reinforces accountability. 
Fourth, courts are not protagonists of the enforcement of rights. Judges 
do enhance democracy through substantive commitments, but this does 
not imply that they are central players. Judicial review must remain the 
last resort for any conflict. Political bodies and society must exhaust all of 
the available non-judicial features to incentivize the government to 
improve socio-economic programs. However, since courts must not 
discretionarily dismiss cases, their structure should be prepared to process 
the claims that eventually are brought forth; an abdicative role is not an 
option before a violation of rights.  
 
 
162 The idea of penumbra and open-textured norms is borrowed from Hart: 
[n]ot only are the judges’ power subject to many constraints narrowing his choice from which 
a legislature may be quite free, but since the judges’ power are exercised only to dispose of 
particular instant cases he cannot use these to introduce large-scale reforms or new codes. So 
his powers are interstitial as well as subject to many substantive constraints. None the less 
there will be points where the existing law fails to dictate any decision as the correct one, and 
to decide cases where this is so the judge must exercise his law-making powers. But he must 
not do thus arbitrarily . . . . But if he satisfies these conditions he is entitled to follow 
standards or reasons for decisions which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those 
followed by other judges faced with similar hard cases. 
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 273 (3d ed. 2012) (emphasis removed). 
163 Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is A They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory and the Fallacy of 
Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 553 (2005). 
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Fifth, adversarial private litigation no longer fits public law 
adjudication, especially in the arena of socio-economic rights, where 
norms are open-textured, principled, and non-sanctioning.164 In most cases, 
citizens pursuing claims for health care are not interested in a sanction-
based output, but indeed in a judicial intervention that imposes structural 
improvements in an ongoing public policy. The received litigation model 
is retrospective. It imposes liability on a determined agent or institution 
due to a recognized past act. However, healthcare-based litigation is a 
crucial example of a prospective intervention. Rather than fact-finding, it 
is fact evaluating.165 For this reason, outcomes and impacts of judicial 
intervention matter. As Chayes suggests, “[t]he elaboration of a decree is 
largely a discretionary process within which the trial judge is called upon 
to access and appraise the consequences of alternative programs that might 
correct the substantive fault.”166 
This new profile requires redefining the relationship between rights and 
remedies. Under traditional litigation, remedies derive directly from rights 
determination. The courts’ primary role is to protect rights and legal 
interests. Therefore, recognizing a violation of a right leads to prescribing 
a corresponding remedy, whose content is narrowed to and derived from 
the content of the right. It results in a binary approach–“the court either 
accepts the outputs of the community institutions or directs a different 
 
 
164 I take “traditional private litigation” as Scott defines it: 
 According to the traditional view, law is about rule elaboration and enforcement. The 
judiciary bears a distinctive institutional responsibility for elaborating and enforcing public 
norms, and applying those norms to facts filtered through formal adjudicative process. 
Normative and factual activities from other domains operate as inputs to be processed and 
then outcomes to be judged. 
 A legal norm thus operates under this view as a code of conduct that gives rise to clear 
obligations to address well-understood problems with clear normative implications. Such a 
rule must be sufficiently clear, concise, and general to justify attaching coercive consequences 
to the rule's violation. Courts use analogy, logic, and moral intuition to define the problem at 
the core of the relevant authoritative principle, to formulate or apply a standard or rule to 
address that problem, and then to construct a hierarchical relationship between the judiciary 
and other public bodies to implement those specified rules. Legal pronouncements should 
settle disagreements or uncertainties about the nature and scope of problematic activity and its 
relationship to the generally articulated constitutional or statutory principles calling for 
judicial interpretation. 
 
Joanne Scott & Susan P. Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Rethinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 
13 COLUM. J.  EUR. L. 565, 568 (2007). See also Kathleen G. Noonan, Charles Sabel, & William H. 
Simon, The Rule of Law in the Experimentalist Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 34 
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 523 (2009). 
165 Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 
1297 (1976). 
166 Id. at 1296. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/12
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019] BEYOND MINIMALISM AND USURPATION 541  
 
 
 
 
outcome”167–that creates distance from the problem-solving approach 
sought by public law litigation and hampers courts’ purposes of enhancing 
equality and shaping their legitimacy. Amid those extreme answers, there 
is a broad range of legal outputs that courts may explore, since “remedial 
design requires a different type of decision-making from rights 
determination,”168 and “involves more technical, strategic, and contextual 
forms of thought”169 rather than merely analyzing legal principles and rules 
and treating rights as trump cards.170 
Under those assumptions, the language of impersonal rights and 
principles also becomes limited to addressing the complex tradeoff 
involving the enforcement of socio-economic rights. Amid legal 
parameters, courts must exercise creativity and institutional innovation in 
order to verify the kind of social intervention and the standards required to 
obtain positive impacts according to the transformative constitutional plan. 
Health care-related litigation proved that producing evidence of needs, 
beneficiaries, and social impacts is an essential step of the legal analysis. 
Investing in remedial design requires reshaping the relation between 
rights, remedies, and outputs in a way where remedies become more 
interdependent – rather than dependent – of the rights determination.171 
Sixth, as Joanne Scott and Susan Sturm argue, courts exercise a 
catalyst function, by which they are “poised to act as arbiters of interaction 
across different levels of governance and institutional roles”172 regarding 
three main tasks: first, ensuring the participation and the interaction of all 
players involved in the processes; second, monitoring “the adequacy of the 
epistemic or information base for decision-making within new 
governance”;173 and third, imposing transparency and accountability to 
procedures as a source of reasoned decision-making. Katharine Young 
builds on this conception to suggest that courts act “to lower the political 
energy that is required to change the protection of economic and social 
rights, or at least the way in which the government responds to the 
protection of economic and social rights.”174 
All of these assumptions are part of what Landau calls the dynamic 
judicial role. He identifies this as a reasonable variation of the judicial role 
 
 
167 Scott & Sturm, supra note 164, at 569. 
168 Sabel, supra note 27, at 1054. 
169 Id. 
170 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). 
171 See Sabel, supra note 27. 
172 Scott &  Sturm, supra note 164, at 567.  
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in dysfunctional democracies, whose courts sometimes are more 
concerned with improving the democratic character of the functioning 
institutions rather than exercising a counter-majoritarian behavior. Courts 
also “aim to improve the performance of political institutions over time.”175 
Therefore, this new role assumed by courts reshapes the structure of 
litigation. As a social institution, litigation has two sides: “it is at once a 
process for authoritative adjudication of legal disputes and a vehicle for 
partisan manipulation of bargaining advantage.”176 Judicial practice has 
traditionally focused on the former, but the stakes we are building also 
requires enriching the latter, since litigation assumes that dispute 
resolution in some kinds of cases–especially public law litigation–
demands systemic organizational change.177 Therefore, as soon as judges 
realize their influence on the allocation of the parties’ bargaining power, 
experimentalist interventions tend to replace command-and-control 
injunctions, along with the impact of courts’ choices over the participants, 
the procedure, the remedies, the level of scrutiny, and the outcomes, 
among other characteristics of the lawsuit. 
Seventh, new governance doctrine provides an appropriate approach 
regarding the notion of courts as catalysts as a path to reconcile economic 
efficiency, political legitimacy, and social democracy. The fact that new 
governance has emerged within the administrative activities, by 
“challenging the traditional focus on formal regulation as the dominant 
locus of change,”178 does not mean that judicial practice shall not embody 
some of its premises. In fact, the whole change that administrative bodies 
have faced necessarily requires a change to litigation in order to 
accommodate this new architecture of power practice.  
Eighth, as Young claims, judicial review comprises at least five major 
forms. Rather than a scale from the weaker up to the stronger review, they 
result from a mix between different forms of interpretation, remedies, and 
power dynamics, since courts’ power is multidimensional.179  
In the deferential view, “courts give credence to the democratic 
authority and epistemic superiority of, and textual conferral of tasks to, the 
legislative and executive branches.”180 In the conversational view, the 
 
 
175 Landau, supra note 153, at 1503. 
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dialogical interaction between the courts and the other political institutions 
drives a conjoint process in which all of the actors construct a feasible 
interpretation of the right, as well as the appropriate model of 
enforcement. Canada provides an accurate example of this perspective. In 
the experimentalism view, the courts “engage in a vigorous assessment of 
the reasonableness of policy or legislation, involving a contextualized 
investigation against the commitments of the constitution.”181 Remedies 
take a limited form (intermediate level of intervention) but are capable of 
achieving strong structural reforms. In the managerial review, structural 
injunctions are combined with managerial remedies, by which courts 
engage in higher levels of intervention, commanding substantive 
interferences on public functions, by either upholding/striking legislation 
or imposing the state’s concrete measures to achieve normative goals. In 
the peremptory review, judges assume the highest level of interference. 
For instance, rather than upholding or striking down legislation, courts 
define the meaning of the legislation to be passed or amended, regardless 
of the potential response of the other branches.  
There is no need to pick just one of the models; each of them presents 
benefits and burdens that courts must balance when deciding the 
appropriate remedy. For example, Landau recognizes that each kind of 
remedy benefits specific social profiles, and creates different incentives 
and disincentives to the government, as potential responses to courts’ 
rulings.182 This approach focuses on interpreting the models as a catalog of 
non-definite alternatives that influence subsequent players’ behavior, 
rather than a multiple-choice test with only one correct option. In so doing, 
it defines the substantive outcomes of judicial intervention, namely, the 
social and moral benefits along with its costs. Under certain institutional 
arrangements, judges must conduct a process of gathering information and 
engaging affected bodies’ participation in order to verify the appropriate 
model to address the rights violation covered by a problem-solving 
approach.  
However, leaving open the model of judicial review does not refrain 
judges from committing to the lowest possible level of intervention 
regarding the separation of powers clause. In this case, courts will have to 
find the optimal level of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. 
This scenario would consist of a situation that simultaneously ensures as 
many benefits as possible to the target group while reducing the costs 
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imposed on other involved actors. Judges should seek to improve social 
welfare and equality, both in an objective perspective–in asking what the 
benefits and costs are–and in a subjective perspective–in asking who bears 
the costs and who receives the benefits–thus ensuring benefits and costs 
affect or relieve each of them as fairly as possible. 
The next section will propose some practical guidelines for the 
Brazilian model of enforcement, taking the aforementioned stakes into 
account. 
 3.3. Imagining it differently: Some practical guidelines  
In the last section, this work built theoretical stakes that could 
incentivize judges to commit with a conception of enforcement that meets 
five criteria. First, it considers substantive issues more likely to erupt in 
socio-economic rights, such as needs and the needy. Second, it addresses 
background rules that also interfere with the dynamics of enforcement, 
such as the distributive and aggregative effects. Third, it embodies a 
transparent procedure that provides substantive scrutiny in public policies, 
engages affected players in the process, gathers the necessary information 
to build a comprehensive picture of the social phenomena in discussion, 
and promotes accountability of the public institutions, including the courts. 
Fourth, it induces players to look retro- and prospectively, which means 
that outputs are also designed according to the desirable impact that is 
necessary to reach dispute resolution. Finally, it takes into account other 
constraints on judicial review, such as the separations of power clause. 
The following question summarizes those points: within all of the 
constitutional constraints on judicial review, how is it possible to reach 
concrete, sustainable, and democratic structural changes by adopting the 
lowest level of intervention possible? 
Under those theoretical parameters, this section will propose some 
practical methods to address the mis-enforcement of rights in the Brazilian 
case. It is beyond the scope of this work to offer a definite blueprint of 
structural reforms. The following proposals are only an initial list of 
feasible ways to address the issue. Some of these methods align with the 
already ongoing experiences at the local level, which should be improved 
and expanded on. 
Taking the conflicts out of the courts. All of the methods proposed 
regarding the desirable design of judicial review and the possibility of 
courts to enhance democracy by enforcing socio-economic rights do not 
shift the ideal that executive and legislative branches still remain the 
appropriate place for developing, implanting, and improving public 
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policies. Judicial intervention is the most traumatic and the most 
politically costly solution regarding enforcement of rights. The risk it 
poses justifies the following constitutional premise: court enforcement is 
the last resort, although sometimes necessary. 
Therefore, non-judicial dispute resolution methods should be utilized 
whenever possible. The National Council of Justice set up state-level 
committees, whose purpose is to develop programs of alternative dispute 
resolutions on health care-related litigation. Some of them have developed 
profitable experiences. Since 2013, the Federal District committee–which 
unites judges, public defenders, public attorneys, doctors, and state 
officials–has tested different strategies to incentivize mediation between 
claimants and the government on questions regarding medicines and non-
emergency medical services.183 The committee follows the case until the 
state performs the agreement in order to ensure its entire compliance. After 
three years of experience, the National Council of Justice stated that, 
although there had been no reduction of new claims (no incentive to 
reduce litigation), the program has provided faster and more effective tools 
for enforcement of the right to health care through dialogical interactions 
between claimants and institutional players.184 
Another sensitive circumstance is the lack of regulation disciplining 
details of public policies. For instance, as noted in the previous sections, 
Article 196 of the 1988 Constitution defined the universal right to health. 
Stating a universal right without specifically defining the services, 
recipients, priorities, and requirements of access unreasonably enlarges the 
area of normative uncertainty. By doing so, the executive and legislative 
branches voluntarily delegate these topics to be defined by courts. 
A comparison with the social security system exemplifies this 
controversy. The constitution and the statutes define the services (such as 
temporary and permanent pensions due to retirements, disabilities, and 
incarceration) and their requirements, as well as the beneficiaries covered 
by the social security system. The area of normative uncertainty is smaller 
than that of health care-related legislation, directly influencing the related 
litigation. In social security-related litigation, most of the claims are 
brought against a formal denial of a benefit due to the alleged lack of a 
legal requirement. Thus, there is no space for courts to redefine what 
services will be provided by the government: the room for judicial 
 
 
183 See CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA, JUDICIALIZAÇÃO DA SAÚDE NO BRASIL: DADOS E 
EXPERIÊNCIA 41-53 (2015). 
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discretion is reduced. 
Structuring a new health care system, or even suggesting how it should 
be structured, is far beyond the scope of this work. However, since our 
purpose includes finding the roots of the mis-enforcement of socio-
economic rights, the lack of regulation proves to be an important issue. 
This conclusion does not contradict the style of soft and broad rules 
adopted by the new governance doctrine, since those characteristics do not 
exempt the legislative branch from assuming a duty of defining norms that 
provide objective standards to guide the other branches. In the Brazilian 
health care system, more than uncertain normativity, there is a vacuum of 
regulation. Most of the rules defining the health system are expressed in 
resolutions enacted by the Ministry of Health. However, these resolutions 
are not legal primary resources and are not always binding, thus leading to 
courts’ tendencies to ignore their terms. In addition, the lack of a definitive 
division of competences between the three federal levels–the federal 
union, the states, and the municipalities–induces overlapping claims (the 
same claim brought against different defendants in different lawsuits), or 
claims that are simultaneously brought against the federal union, the state, 
and the municipality. This disrupts compliance in general and reduces the 
effectiveness of the litigation system.  
Reshaping the profile of the litigation system. More than 90% of the 
claims involving health care-related litigation are individualized. Although 
a number of reasons could justify this scenario, a massive culture of 
litigation and a weak system of collective actions are part of its structural 
roots. 
Endless and ineffective collective actions in Brazil make them an 
unattractive tool for the enforcement of socio-economic rights. The 
procedure basically reproduces the same pattern as individual claims 
without presenting any strategy for providing a faster and more effective 
result. In addition, norms of compliance, territorial reach, and legal 
representation of parties are confusing. Courts are more likely to deliver a 
negative answer under collective actions, so claimants end up choosing an 
individualized lawsuit as a shortcut to grant their rights. 
Landau’s description of the effects of socio-economic rights remedies 
also reveals two important factors. First, likely beneficiaries of the 
individualized enforcement are middle- and upper-class groups instead of 
the lower-class groups, who are benefited under structural enforcement. 
Second, unlike individualized enforcement, structural enforcement may 
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alter bureaucratic behavior.185 
I would disagree with Landau’s second conclusion. Although 
individualized enforcement seems to produce no incentive for change of 
bureaucratic behavior, under the Brazilian context the aggregative effect 
due to the massive litigation transforms an apparent inoffensive individual 
claim into a huge group of similar lawsuits compromising a considerable 
part of the budget. As shown in the previous sections, the massive 
individual litigation also influences health care public policies, as the 
Executive tends in long turn to universalize treatments and medicines that 
are frequently enforced by courts. The case of the HIV/AIDS drugs-related 
litigation is the most powerful example. 
Therefore, I would say that aggregate individualized enforcement does 
alter bureaucratic behavior. However, it probably does so with a higher 
marginal cost than what would be necessary to achieve the same result 
under structural enforcement. For this reason, this kind of litigation should 
be disincentivized. 
The Brazilian data fit Landau’s classification, in the sense that 
achieving structural enforcement seems to be the most effective way to 
incentivize government to improve services and to target low-income 
groups. Eventually, institutional innovation should be set to reduce 
individualized claims and increase the collective claims. 
Redefining collective actions. Redefining the system of collective 
actions is mandatory. As the provided evidence demonstrates, judges are 
more likely to address background rules and aggregative and distributive 
impacts in collective actions rather than in individualized claims. 
Strengthening collective actions would also address the issue of the lack of 
representativeness of disadvantaged groups in courts. The most 
disadvantaged groups in Brazil are likely to not have appropriate 
information regarding rights and access to courts. This factor may lead to 
situations of mis-enforcement, since the upper and middle classes, which 
are more empowered to bring issues before courts, benefit from the 
litigation instead of the lower class. In Brazil, collective actions may be 
proposed by selected private and public institutions, such as the Public 
Defense Office, on behalf of third parties. Thus, a strong system of 
collective actions could be designed to compensate the difficulties of 
disadvantaged groups in accessing courts. 
However, issues of execution and compliance, among others, make 
collective actions in Brazil unattractive, which consists in incentives for 
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individualized claims. It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a 
detailed project of how to fix these issues, but improving the collective 
actions system would be desirable to reduce the mis-enforcement of social 
rights. 
The role of precedent. The Brazilian litigation system favors 
individualized instead of collective claims, and thus, realigning incentives 
in order to favor the latter is mandatory. Beyond procedural reforms, 
establishing precedent on the issue could embody an important strategy of 
creating incentives to reduce individualized claims. 
The lack of precedent about health care-related litigation is a troubling 
aspect. Even though Brazil does not adopt the stare decisis principle, the 
Constitution allows the Supreme Court and other Superior Courts to 
establish a binding effect over some rulings, especially in repetitive and 
highly controversial cases.186 Surprisingly, although it has agreed to hear 
some cases involving the right to health-care, the Supreme Court has not 
yet issued binding rulings on this topic. Some of these cases have been 
suspended due to requests of Justices who intend to take more time 
analyze the issue. For this reason, the lower courts do not dispose of safe 
standards to follow.  
Precedent can play a central role in the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights. Defining exactly what the public services must cover–in 
other words, specifically defining the core of the needs, the beneficiaries, 
and the priorities that the state should provide–is not the constitutionally 
appropriate function of the judicial branch. Judges would subsume the 
state officials’ discretion, much less the separations of powers clause. 
However, under the idea of “evaluative comparisons over distinct social 
realizations,”187 precedent can resolve not only borderline cases, but also 
can define what kind of claims fall outside the constitutional protection, in 
concert with general clauses defined by the executive and the legislative 
branches (in general, basic needs for disadvantaged groups). For instance, 
the Supreme Court and the Superior Court could state what kind of 
medical services and medicines cannot be enforced, such as experimental 
treatments, unproven drugs, and expensive experimental drugs; they may 
also determine which claimants cannot benefit from enforcement, such as 
non-users of the public health care system. According to this approach, 
Superior Courts would not define exactly who the beneficiaries should be, 
what services should be provided, and what priorities should be adopted. 
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By analyzing concrete situations that are not clearly resolved by 
regulation, precedent would play an exclusionary role, focusing on 
defining which claims are outside the constitutional protection of the right 
to health care. In addition, precedent can also provide objective standards 
and tests to guide judges to verify aggregative and distributive effects. 
Overall, this strategy may induce a reduction in litigation, as well as a 
decrease in the negative effects of individualized enforcement, as most of 
the borderline claims are brought by middle- and upper-classes. Thus, a 
detailed definition of the claims that do not receive constitutional 
protection would disincentivize repetitive suits that fall out the category 
“basic needs for the most disadvantaged individuals” and mostly benefit 
advantaged groups. In the long term, this would lead judicial enforcement 
to benefit lower-income groups, whose claims are generally related with 
the most basic needs, reducing the likelihood of situations of mis-
enforcement. 
Gathering information and engaging players. Establishing a legal 
reasoning that explores the language of needs, priorities, and 
beneficiaries–and also addresses social impacts due to background rules 
(such as aggregative and distributive effects)–requires courts to go beyond 
right-based arguments. In practice, this means that the procedure should 
bring evidence about those issues in order to permit courts to build a 
decision more likely to produce substantial positive impacts on equality 
and democracy. 
The evidence should take as many forms as the civil procedure permits. 
A recent experience of the District Court of Brasilia shows how simple 
procedural innovations may improve the enforcement of rights. Repetitive 
claims asking for expensive treatments and medicines–especially for rare 
diseases–called the attention of the district court judges. Concessive 
rulings basically relied on medical prescriptions presented by the 
claimants. Since costs of compliance reached R$900 million in 2015 in the 
Federal District alone, Judges’ concern about the aggregative effects of 
these rulings led them to agree with a claim of the Union, in order to 
determine an official expert to double check the efficacy of the requested 
drug in each case.188 There is still no definite empirical study about this 
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experience, but surprising results came out: in a number of cases, the 
expert testimony has contradicted the medical prescriptions presented by 
the claimants, by either attesting that the requested treatment/drug is not 
effective for the specific case, or providing cheaper, alternative options.189 
As a consequence, costs of compliance reduced.190 In sum, this simple 
procedural innovation creates a disincentive for patients to seek before 
courts more expansive treatments not available in the public system, when 
there are available, cheaper alternatives already provided by the state.  
Bringing supporting information about public policies and government 
choices also helps courts understand the steps that the state took to 
implement each socio-economic right. This gives a more realistic account 
of the outcomes of any intervention. It is important to involve the players 
that any judicial decisions could affect, so that they can bring distinct 
perspectives of the social issue at stake. It seems arbitrary to decide an 
intervention on an ongoing policy without any inquiry into the reasons 
why the executive and legislative branches have prioritized one need over 
another, or what measures the state has already adopted to address a 
specific conflict. The judicial procedure matches this purpose exactly, 
since its dialectical approach allows the parties to engage in a constructive 
interlocution that would end up improving the quality of the enforcement. 
Public engagement may also be improved. The Brazilian Supreme 
Court introduced the public hearings191 in 2007, whereby the justices hear 
the testimony of scientists and authorities when necessary to clarify issues 
or factual circumstances with general implications and relevant public 
interest regarding on-going cases before the Court. Its regulation 
determines an open application process, by which any person or 
institution–not only parties or special guests–may qualify for the event, 
which is also broadcast on public TV and on the internet. Of sixteen public 
hearings held through the end of 2014, eight explored judicial enforcement 
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189 Projeto de juízes da Justiça Federal do DF sobre doenças raras tem o seu primeiro 
levantamento, supra note 188. 
190 Id. 
191 Professor Mark Tushnet distinguishes Brazilian public hearings from the U.S. amicus curiae 
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of socio-economic rights: the health care public system (2009, 2013, and 
2014), regulation of alcoholic beverages on the roads (2012), an asbestos 
ban (2012), affirmative actions (2012), fire-sticking in sugarcane farming 
(2013), and imprisonment (2013).192 According to Tushnet, these hearings 
“can be understood as blending political and judicial constitutionalism,”193 
since their discussions accommodate both legal and policy arguments 
relying on the constitutional interpretation of a varied range of state and 
non-state institutions. 
Those public hearings have also been adopted in collective actions; 
however, trial judges have resisted engaging in this experience. A few 
public hearings have taken place around the country. Some judges have 
been skeptical about participants using these events as political platforms. 
Others have expressed concerns regarding the appropriate way to handle 
the desirable community engagement, in order to translate those moments 
into a productive constitutional discussion. Judges usually do not feel 
comfortable in assuming roles that go out of the traditional track, but this 
idea could be reinforced and improved through more structured programs. 
Eventually, taking the process as a locus of dialectical competition 
among players affected by the social conflicts at stake is an essential 
feature of broadening the language of the courts and of improving the 
scrutiny that they engage through judicial review mechanisms. Gathering 
information neither directly reduces mis-enforcement, nor functions as a 
guarantee of substantially enhancing equality. It even determines the 
concessive or non-concessive answer to the claim, since they do not seek 
to confirm a preconceived result. However, it is a feature that expands and 
qualifies the constitutional discussion taken by courts in preventing them 
from overlooking data that influence the result of their intervention in 
policies. In the end, this exercise may turn to improve the democratic side 
of the judicial outputs.   
Disentangling remedies from rights. Insufficient attention has been 
given to the relation between remedies and enforcement of socio-
economic rights. Scholars’ recommendations to address the issues that 
emerge from the judicial intervention focus on the rights-based arguments. 
For example, after an extensive empirical analysis, Octavio Ferraz 
concludes that “judges would need to be more restrictive in their 
 
 
192 Realizadas, SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL, 
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interpretation of the right to health.”194 Hoffman and Bentes hold similar 
views.195 Remedies have been taken as a mere liable consequence of the 
right’s violation. Once a judge recognizes the violation of the universal 
right to health, he applies a remedy to compensate that specific situation, 
regardless the way it affects the parties and indirect players. 
The last section stated that the relation between rights and remedies 
should be transformed in the Brazilian system. Breaking the absolute 
dependency between the two and taking remedies as a bridge between the 
right determination and the right enforcement would be a powerful 
innovation to reduce mis-enforcement. Therefore, they would function as 
an equalizer between the abstract analysis of legal rules and impersonal 
principles, and the concrete analysis of impacts and trade off regarding 
background rules that influence the enforcement. In this model, remedies 
must not only serve the right violation, but also the concrete impact of the 
judicial decision. 
The ruling of the Extraordinary Appeal 580252 to compensate 
prisoners for prison conditions is a recent move, undertaken by the 
Brazilian Supreme Court in 2015, that can be taken as an example of this 
idea’s feasibility.196 Plaintiffs claimed that repetitive individualized claims 
brought by prisoners against the government asked for damages due to the 
inhumane environment in prisons. They also stated that incarceration 
under inhumane conditions had caused undeniable systemic violations of 
fundamental rights, since overcrowded cells, poor sanitary conditions, and 
a lack of policies to reengage inmates in social life have been part of a 
severe context that led the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to 
prosecute Brazil.197 Lower courts in general ordered the government to pay 
individual damages. Once again, the point of aggregate impacts of the 
individualized litigation arose with an additional aggravating element, 
according to the plaintiffs. The payment of individual damages is costly 
and does not directly improve the penitentiary system at all, since the state 
will reallocate the budget not to reform the imprisonment system, but to 
compensate a damage without fixing the social problem. Under the 
perspective of mis-enforcement, this situation is described as critical: in 
aggregate terms, the government spends high amount of money paying 
 
 
194 See Ferraz, supra note 22, at 100. 
195 See Hoffman & Bentes, supra note 25, at 127-32, 138-40. 
196 See S.T.F., RE 580.252, Relator: Min. Alexandre de Moraes, 16.02.2017, SUPREMO 
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damages, while no social right is enforced. 
This case exposed a lengthy controversy before the Supreme Court. In 
2015, Justice Teori Zavascki voted for upholding a lower court’s decision 
approving the damages. Although his opinion had been majoritarian, the 
dissent led by Justice Roberto Barroso, Justice Luis Fux, and Justice Celso 
de Mello raised an important discussion on the disaggregation between 
rights and remedies.198 They argued that this payment would not address the 
grounds of the structural and systemic human rights violation. Moreover, 
since the court was deciding individualized claims, individualized answers 
should be given. Thus, they suggested an innovative remedy. Instead of 
damages, prisoners should be given reductions in their sentence length, 
which would function better than monetary payment according to them,199 
since it is more desirable to allow the state to spend its limited budget on 
reforming prisons rather than on paying individual damages. 
In the same year, the court judged another case on the prison system 
and recognized that executive and legislative branches have not been 
undertaking appropriate measures to improve prisons.200 On the contrary, 
the court found that the Executive had not entirely spent its budget for the 
penitentiary system, and that prisons were overcrowded and under 
inhumane conditions, with several reports of police abuse.201 As a 
consequence, it issued a structural injunction relying on the Colombian 
doctrine of unconstitutional state of affairs.202 The court ordered 1) that the 
executive utilize the budget of the National Penitentiary Fund for its legal 
purposes, and 2) that judicial authorities hear individuals within twenty-
four hours after their arrest by the police, in order to verify whether the 
police followed the legal requirements and treated the individual 
adequately, as well as whether imprisonment should continue.203 
This is a case of strong judicial review of administrative acts, in which 
the judges were sensitive to the need to design a remedy that minimally 
impacted policies, but set up an effective incentive to address the social 
problem. Charles Sabel explains that “the message that the new public law 
sends to prospective defendants is not that they will suffer any specific set 
of consequences in the event of default, but that they will suffer loss of 
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200 See generally S.T.F., APDF 347, Relator: Min. Marco Aurelio, 09.09.2015, SUPREMO 
TRIBUNAL FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCIA [S.T.F.J.], 11.09.2017 (Braz.), 
http://stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/listarConsolidada.asp?classe=ADPF&numero=347&origem=AP. 
201 Id. at 4-5, 8-14. 
202 Id. at 12, 178. 
203 Id. at 4-5. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
554 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW     [VOL. 18:493 
 
 
 
 
independence and increased uncertainty.”204 This is the key to 
understanding the purpose of structural injunctions. They should serve not 
to replace the discretion of the public institutions, but to fix specific issues 
during their typical processes, such as the representativeness and the 
deliberative quality in the case of legislative decisions, and the adherence 
of the bureaucracy to the political process in the case of administrative 
decisions.205 
Those two cases, more than being a mere departure from the traditional 
model of litigation, show that the court is open to seeking a remedial 
design approach. It is possible to go further, though. A procedural 
mechanism that allowed superior courts to cluster a group of repetitive 
individualized claims and then to convert them into a single structural 
tutela would definitely change the shape of the socio-economic rights-
related litigation. Courts could address the issue at stake as a collective 
action and thus target not only the individual parties, but all of the groups 
in the same situation. In the foregoing case of damages for prisoners, the 
court–by recognizing a social issue that impacted a huge group–could 
convert a bunch of individualized cases into one collective claim and 
could impose structural injunctions according to information gathered 
during the process in order to adopt a problem-solving perspective that 
would be more effective under constitutional parameters.  
This new mechanism would incentivize judges to have a broad and 
systemic comprehensive picture of the enforcement of a specific right, as 
well as to undertake remedies as a bridge between legal and informal 
norms. In the long run, individualized actions would be discouraged in 
favor of collective actions. This would also fix the representation issue. A 
fair criticism against enforcement of rights in individualized claims is that 
they only benefit parties who have access to bring a claim before courts. 
This point is more problematic in a country of huge inequalities such as 
Brazil, since disadvantaged groups face barriers against their engagement 
in defending their rights. 
Eventually, this separation between rights and remedies serves not only 
to improve structural injunctions, but also to reinforce the idea of remedial 
design. For instance, courts could add a monitoring task to a dialogical 
remedy through inspiration by the Indian model.206 Instead of merely 
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communicating to the executive branch the necessity of promoting a new 
medical treatment, judges could follow this process in order to make sure 
that officials are complying with the ruling. This could include assigning 
deadlines, asking for a plan of implementation, etc. 
 
CONCLUSION: NEW CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES 
FOR DYSFUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACIES  
 
In April 2016, the Brazilian Supreme Court overruled the provisional 
ruling and liberated the University of São Paulo from the duty of 
furnishing phosphoethanolamine to a single plaintiff.207 Justice 
Lewandowski’s opinion for the court recognized that the judicial 
intervention in that case caused perverse aggregate and distributive 
impacts, due to the massive litigation that followed the ruling delivered by 
the court.208 Regarding the fact that the efficacy of the substance had still 
been unproven, he also requested that the court set a public hearing to 
receive testimony from experts and third parties about its scientific 
efficacy.209 This decision has not been set as a precedent, though the court 
may do so after the hearings. Although this precedent does not bind lower 
courts, some of them have already followed the same reasoning and turned 
to denying new claims. 
Meanwhile, due to the national repercussion of the 
phosphoethanolamine-related litigation, the Congress, after intense 
legislative debate on the issue, passed in 2016 a bill to allow 
pharmaceutical industries to produce this compound.210 In the same fashion, 
the National Health Surveillance Agency started an official procedure to 
review ongoing research on phosphoethanolamine, in order to decide 
whether this substance should be included in cancer treatments provided 
by state hospitals. However, in 2017, this agency decided to suspend 
phosphoethanolamine-related ads, in an important move to disincentivize 
the use of this substance.211 
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Beyond all of the criticism from the mainstream constitutional scholars, 
judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights may cause positive social 
change and political engagement. Regarding the institutional 
arrangements, situations of mis-enforcement–which have not been shown 
to make up the majority of the cases–do not constitute grounds for 
requiring courts to abdicate their role of supporting the transformative 
ideals of the 1988 Constitution.212 
However, regarding some perverse outputs that courts have been 
producing, two questions guided this work: how could this process of 
social change be less traumatic and more effective, and how may courts 
improve necessary interventions? Answering these questions demands we 
go beyond the discourses of minimalism and usurpation in order to 
understand the actual role of courts in the governance of dysfunctional 
democracies. 
This Article offered two main contributions. The first is found by 
introducing a case study about Brazil in the comparative constitutional law 
field. The Comparative Constitutional Law doctrine presents a broad range 
of analyses from the U.S., many European countries, India, Colombia, and 
South Africa, but there are few studies on the Brazilian judicial system. 
Filling this gap is an important step in putting this country on track for the 
most prominent academic analyses. It also relies on the acknowledgement 
that the Brazilian constitutional history has interesting experiences and 
particularities that should be shared.  
Although the case study focused on the Brazilian litigation, most of this 
discussion applies to other developing countries. An interesting 
forthcoming task would be to expand this analysis in order to double 
check to what extent its conclusions qualify for: South Africa, Mexico, 
Argentina, Colombia, and India, and others. If those countries’ 
experiences directly inspired this work, it certainly reflects some of their 
constitutional challenges. 
 This point leads to the second contribution, which involved the 
engagement in an emerging and urgent debate on constitutional law: 
judicial role in dysfunctional democracies. The mainstream American 
discourses of minimalism and usurpation focus on healthy democracies 
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with strong constitutional cultures.213 For this reason, they do not offer a 
complete account of what happens in countries like Brazil, Hungary, and 
India, where a dysfunctional political system induces atypical institutional 
arrangements that influence how courts adjudicate and impact social life. 
Brazilian courts–as non-elected and independent bodies–have assumed 
an unassigned task: the enhancement of democracy through commanding 
other political institutions to adhere to their duties under the 
transformative constitutional project. This task is not evident to the 
traditional constitutional mainstream in Brazil and elsewhere, especially 
when it involves a strong review and structural injunctions. However, I 
offered a critique of the critique for this adjudicative pattern: this 
unfamiliar role does fit the institutional arrangement of unhealthy 
democracies, but must not be taken without limits.  
The concept of mis-enforcement motivates a project that 
simultaneously 1) accepts that courts hold an important role in fixing 
democratic asymmetries within atypical political environments, such as in 
the case of the right to health, but also 2) denounces that they may end up 
assuming a populist approach if they overlook their counter-majoritarian 
task and the institutional arrangements within which they interact. 
Therefore, accommodating representativeness and counter-
majoritarianism, under a problem-solving perspective, requires rethinking 
the way that courts 1) address social reality and legal norms, and 2) choose 
and design their outputs. The health care-related litigation case brought 
evidence of how courts may significantly contribute to enhance 
democracy, but also of how courts may cause disasters if they don’t have 
eyes wide open regarding how institutions and structures of power really 
operate, how agents really interact, and what kind of trade off any choice 
implies. An accurate diagnosis of the mis-enforcement phenomenon–and 
its uncertainties, complexities, and imperfections–invites structural 
redesign by departing from the current problematic stage through a multi-
step process of reasoned and ranked interventions.214 This will make it 
possible to gradually remove or reshape dysfunctional elements of the 
litigation system towards a more effective operation.215 
This work proposes a few practical guidelines to address and to qualify 
this experience of judicial practice that has been long misrepresented: 
disincentives for individualized claims, reform of the collective action 
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system, enhancement of the dialogical capacity of the courts, and 
reshaping of the ties between rights and remedies. These guidelines are far 
from enough; more structural changes are imperative. The permanent 
question should be how the components of the judicial review system–
procedures, remedies, and levels of scrutiny, among others–should be 
improved to ensure that their substantive moral outcomes would reflect the 
constitutional values.  A procedure designed for private law litigation can 
no longer accommodate complex public law issues,216 and a closed 
conception of law does not fit in a fast-changing reality. Transformative 
constitutional projects do not coexist with fossilized legal structures. 
It is time to look at this prospectively and assume some challenges. 
Developing countries with dysfunctional democracies demand specific 
theoretical constructions that consider their own political issues and 
constitutional experiences. Transplants of doctrines and norms without 
minimal contextual check have been a pervasive and perverse practice 
undertaken by developing countries’ scholars.217 Those new approaches 
should also bridge constitutional law to other social sciences, especially 
political science, through a transparent compromise of bringing data to 
courts while bringing data to evaluate how courts work. 
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